

Solomon Islands

**PEACE AND CONFLICT
DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS**

**Emerging Priorities in Preventing
Future Violent Conflict**

Emerging Priorities in Preventing Future Violent Conflict

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	ii
PREFACE	iv
ABBREVIATIONS	v
BRIEF DEFINITIONS	vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
ANALYSIS OF THE TENSIONS	1
GUIDELINES AND PRINCIPLES FOR PROGRAMMING	2
KEY ORIENTATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT, DONORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY	3
CORE ISSUES AND PERCEPTIONS AFFECTING PEACE AND CONFLICT	
OVERVIEW	5
CORE INTER-RELATED PEACE AND CONFLICT FACTORS	6
<i>Land</i>	6
<i>Traditional versus Non-Traditional Authority Structures</i>	10
<i>Access to Government Services, Public Resources and Information</i>	12
<i>Economic Opportunity</i>	14
<i>Law and Justice</i>	18
AVOIDING FALSE AND SIMPLE LABELS OF CONFLICT IN SOLOMON ISLANDS	22
<i>Armed Stakeholders</i>	24
<i>Variations in Levels and Patterns of Violence</i>	25
ANALYSIS OF DONOR RESPONSES	28
GUIDELINES AND PRINCIPLES	31
RECOMMENDATIONS	39
REFERENCES	47
<i>Annex 1 Guidance Note on PCDA</i>	49
<i>Annex 2 Donor Responses Matrix</i>	51
<i>Annex 3 PCDA Approach and Tools</i>	53
<i>Annex 4: Terms of Reference</i>	60
<i>Annex 5: Consultation list</i>	66

PREFACE

“We know a lot of things to be true about social violence; we just don’t know when they will be true.” - *James Rule*

Before launching into what peace and conflict-related development analysis is, and how it has been developed and applied in Solomon Islands through this initiative, it may be useful to begin by highlighting what this exercise is not recommending. This initiative is not recommending that development actors – whether provincial or national governments, donors, NGOs, businesses, or community groups – should change the type of work they are doing. The strengths of these actors lie in the unique set of experiences, knowledge, and capacities that they have developed over the years in their respective areas of work.

In pointing out what this initiative is not, take a glimpse into the most far-reaching implication: in not having to do different work, but doing our work differently, and to ensure that development initiatives contribute to a sustainable and just peace – and to ensure that they do not exacerbate tensions, or push non-violent conflict into the arena of violence. While existing peacebuilding initiatives currently underway in Solomon Islands should be supported if they are effective, it is even more important to systematically consider the peacebuilding or conflict-creating impacts of all of those other activities that are not generally labelled “peacebuilding” initiatives, including development assistance. This “other” work is more prevalent and, arguably, more significant in terms of its potential to have a sustainable peacebuilding or conflict-creating impact.

In light of the relatively short amount of time allocated to the preparation of this exercise, it should not be seen as a full or comprehensive analysis of all actors in all sectors over time. The preparation of a comprehensive analysis would require intensive and extensive interviews with those involved in past and current policies, projects, and programmes throughout all of Solomon Islands. This detailed information would then need to be set in the context of changes in the levels and dynamics of violence (at local and broader levels) over time. This would be a fascinating (and necessary) exercise, but it is well beyond the scope of this exercise.

In an effort to illustrate both how PCDA might be applied, as well as what it might reveal when it is applied, this report is punctuated with text boxes and illustrations intended to draw out some practical considerations concerning the conduct of PCDA, whether by government, NGOs, or donors. Additionally, a short “PCDA Cheat Sheet” is included in the Appendices.

The story of the preparation of a document is always more interesting than the document that finally gets produced. The mission in Solomon Islands was intense and enriching for the team, and hopefully for the more than 300 individuals, groups, and organizations that were so generous with their time and ideas. At the end of the day, we hope that this report is seen as their report; which reflects their concerns, interests and aspirations; and helps them to understand and apply in a systematic fashion what they already know.



ABBREVIATIONS

ACP: Cotonou Agreement: EU, Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Agreement
 ADB: Asian Development Bank
 AFP: Australian Federal Police
 ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum
 ARI: Acute Respiratory Infection
 ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations
 AusAID: Australia Agency for International Development
 BRA: Bougainville Revolutionary Army
 CBO: Community based organization
 CBSI: Central Bank of Solomon Islands
 CEDAW: Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
 CEMA: Commodity Export and Marketing Authority
 COLP: Code of Logging Practices
 CoM: Church of Melanesia
 CPRF: Community Peace and Restoration Fund
 CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child
 CRTC: Community Based Rural Training Centre
 CSN: Civil Society Network
 CSO: Civil Society Organisation
 DBSI: Development Bank of Solomon Islands
 EASI: Economic Association of the Solomon Islands
 EGM: Expert Group meeting
 EU: European Union
 GDI: Gender-related Development Index
 GDP: Gross Domestic Product
 GEM: Gender Empowerment Measurement
 GLF: Guadalcanal Liberation Front
 GRA: Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army
 FSC: Family Support Centre
 HCPI: Honiara Consumer Price Index
 HDI: Human Development Index
 HIS: Health Information System
 HIES: Household Income & Expenditure Survey
 HPI: Human Poverty Index
 IFM: Isatabu Freedom Movement
 ILO: International Labour Organization
 IMF: International Monetary Fund
 IMR: Infant Mortality Rate
 IPMG: International Peace Monitoring Group
 MCH: Maternal and Child Care
 MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
 MEF: Malaita Eagle Force
 MHA: Ministry of Home Affairs
 MoE: Ministry of Education
 MoH: Ministry of Health
 MNPHRD: Ministry of National Planning and Human Resources Development
 MNURP: Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace
 MHMS: Ministry of Health and Medical Services
 MPVG: Monitoring and Planning for Vulnerable Groups
 MYSW: Ministry of Youth Sports and Women
 NERRDP: National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan 2003-2006
 NFE: Non-Formal Education
 NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
 NNS: National Nutrition Survey
 NPC: National Peace Council
 NPF: National Provident Fund

NRRC: National Relief and Rehabilitation Committee
NSA: Non state Actors
NZAID: New Zealand Agency for International Development
ODA: Official Development Assistance
PCDA: Peace and Conflict Development-related Analysis
PCIA: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PFNet: People First Network
PG: Provincial Government
PIC: Peace Implementation Council
PIF: Pacific Islands Forum
PMG: Peace Monitoring Group
PNG: Papua New Guinea
PPF: Participating Police Force
RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RIPEL: Russell Islands Plantation Estates Limited
RSIPF: Royal Solomon Islands Police Force
RTC: Rural Training Centre
SCA: Save the Children Australia
SDA: Seventh Day Adventist
SIARTC: Solomon Islands Association of Rural Training Centres
SICA: Solomon Islands Christian Association
SICHE: Solomon Islands College of Higher Education
SICUL: Solomon Islands Credit Union League
SIDT: Solomon Islands Development Trust
SIEA: Solomon Islands Electricity Authority
SIG: Solomon Islands Government
SIIPA: Solomon Islands Interim Policing Authority
SIISLAP: Solomon Islands Institutional Strengthening Land Admin. Project
SILAJISIP: Solomon Island Law and Justice Sector Institutional Strengthening Programme
SIPL: Solomon Islands Plantations Limited
SIPPA: Solomon Islands Planned Parenthood Association
SIRA: Solomon Islands Rehabilitation Authority
SISBEC: Solomon Islands Small Business Enterprises Centre
SIWA: Solomon Islands Water Authority
SME: Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
SOE: State Owned Enterprise
SSEC: South Seas Evangelical Church
STL: Solomon Taiyo Limited
SWD: Social Welfare Division
TPA: Townsville Peace Agreement
UNDP: United Nation Development Programme
UNESCP: UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund
UNFPA: United Nations Fund for Population Activity
WHO: World Health Organization
VBEP: Village based education programme
VDA: Village Development Worker
YOP: Youth Outreach programme

BRIEF DEFINITIONS

Peace and Conflict-related Development Analysis (PCDA) is a means of assessing the ways in which an intervention may affect, or has affected, the dynamics of peace or conflict in a conflict-prone region. PCDA focuses on: 1) Peacebuilding Impact — those factors that strengthen the chances for peace and decrease the chances that violent conflict will breakout, continue, or start again, and; 2) Conflict-Creating Impact — those factors that increase the chances that conflict will be dealt with through the use of violence (Bush 2003).

Peacebuilding consists of two inseparable parts: (1) the construction of the structures of peace, and (2) the de-construction of the structures of violence. It is not about the imposition of solutions, but the creation of space within which indigenous actors can identify problems and formulate their own solutions.

Impact refers to the actual effects of an intervention – both intended and unintended – on the lives of its “beneficiaries” and others beyond the immediate project outputs (e.g., # of wells dug, # of people trained, people serviced, and so on). In popular usage, “effect” and “result” is sometimes used instead of impact.

Conflict is not necessarily negative or destructive. Problems arise when non-violent conflict(s) turn (or re-turn) violent. The “surprise” about violent conflict is not that it occurs, but that we watch it develop for so long, and do nothing about it — e.g., the disintegration of governments and rule of law, increasing abuses of human rights, the imposition of conflict-creating terms of trade or economic conditionalities, the acceptance of (or participation in) corrupt business practices, the selling of weapons to illegitimate and violent regimes, etc.

“Development” has the potential to be conflictual, destabilizing and subversive because it challenges existing political, economic, and social power structures that stop individuals and groups from attaining their full potential.

The “Tensions” is the phrase used to describe the spiral of violence in Solomon Islands from 1998 to 2003. When this report uses that term, it does so with narrow reference to this period of time while recognizing that this applies to a number of distinct – but intersecting — violent conflicts in different parts of Solomon Islands, by a wide range of armed actors, driven by a variety of motives and objectives. The patterns and implications of these various conflicts are discussed further in this document.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Solomon Islands is moving from a situation of recurrent violent conflict and conflict prone conditions to transition and recovery. Following the arrival of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), security has improved markedly. To assist in consolidating lasting peace, an in-depth and shared understanding of peace and conflict issues, for Solomon Islands is required.

The purpose of this Peace and Conflict-related Development Analysis (PCDA) is to: analyse the causes of tensions in Solomon Islands and areas of conflict with particular reference to development dimensions, and to formulate guidelines and recommendations for donor and Government strategy for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Analysis of the Tensions

In our consultations with over 300 people representing government, donors, private sector, non-government organisations and community representatives, five themes were identified consistently as core issues affecting peace, conflict and development in Solomon Islands. Not only were these seen as integral to understanding “root causes” of the 1998-2003 tensions but it also became apparent that they formed the basis of understanding structural and proximate causes of conflicts that have occurred since colonial times. These five themes are:

- **Land.** The relationship between people’s identity, group allegiances and land is inseparable and disagreements over land occur throughout Solomon Islands. At the root of the tensions, particularly in Guadalcanal and Honiara, was illegal squatting and use of customary lands, the commercialisation of land, rapid population growth and land pressure and poor management of urban growth (particularly around Honiara).
- **Traditional versus Non-Traditional Authority Structures.** Traditional authority (chiefs) has been undermined over time, initially by the Church, then by the Colonial Administration and now by politicians, government and international donors. Solomon Islands now has both traditional and non-traditional systems operating in parallel, namely in the justice and lands sectors. It appears that higher levels of violence have occurred in areas where traditional mechanisms have weakened or broken down. Managing the nexus between traditional and non-traditional systems is critical to ensuring Solomon Islanders accept and implement good governance.
- **Access to Government Services, Public Resources and Information** has been hampered by a system of government where political power has been open to corruption, or at least is perceived as such, where the state is seen to benefit the “group in power” and the public service lacks capacity to deliver services. Lack of access to government, particularly policing and judicial services, and the perceived inequity in benefiting from government services/resources were important drivers in

creating the circumstances, which allowed the Tensions to occur.

- **Economic Opportunity** and the concentration of opportunities on Guadalcanal contributed to creating the circumstances, which allowed the Tensions. Rebuilding the economic foundations of peace will require more than re-opening the industries closed down in the wake of violence because those industries are implicated in creating the conditions that led to the outbreak of violence in the first place.
- **Law and Justice** encompasses everything from law enforcement at the local level to the administration of justice, to competing understandings and approaches to social justice, national unity and reconciliation. The breakdown in traditional and non-traditional law enforcement mechanisms helped to create the “Tensions”.

Guidelines and Principles for Programming

Guidelines and principles have been developed to assist in strengthening the likelihood that programming in Solomon Islands will have a positive peacebuilding impact, regardless of the programme sector. Key guidelines and principles include:

- *A common understanding of the so-called “causes of conflict” is a prerequisite to a coherent joined-up peace building strategy.* There is not a single peace, but many conceptions of peace in Solomon Islands (security, traditional, religious, etc). For the achievement of lasting peace they need to be consolidated or the risk of failure will increase. Different understandings within the donor community can also lead to very different, potentially incoherent or ill-coordinated, responses.
- *Capacity building, participation and ownership as the core principles for all programming.* Without capacity building, participation and ownership of democratic governance and conflict management mechanisms in particular, any beneficial impact will be short-lived. Together, these principles create the space for genuine empowerment of all Solomon Islanders to assume control of decision-making and problem solving; the foundation for a peace that is sustainable, equitable and just.
- *Development policy and programming need to be sensitive to multiple, intersecting conflicts.* One dimensional understandings lead to one-dimensional programming that invites failure and a return to violent conflict. An initial scan of potential peace or conflict impact should include: equity issues, exclusion issues, inclusion issues and corruption or legitimacy questions that may be raised by stakeholder groups. Failure to explicitly monitor the ways in which intra-group and intra-Province conflicts are affected by development may be the Achilles heel for peace in Solomon Islands.
- *Conflict in Solomon Islands cannot, and should not, be labelled an “ethnic conflict” or an “ethnic crisis.”* Treating it as such will reinforce and legitimise the politicised identities created through violence and will compromise peacebuilding-

specific efforts, as well as the positive peacebuilding impacts of development policies, programmes and projects.

- ***The social and economic concerns of landowners must be met in order to address it as a cause of conflict, and for development.*** For this to happen, more consultation with resource owners needs to take place on the shape and form of systems. There is a lack of local acceptance and confidence in the process, strong bias towards recording and registration running counter to local perceptions of land management [and fear of that ‘registration’ equates to takeover], and little focus on how to facilitate the use and management of customary land at the local level.
- ***The process of peacebuilding must be allowed to reshape and re-direct economic policies so that economic growth and lasting peace will be established.*** The post-conflict economic policies need to promote reconstruction, rehabilitation and peacebuilding rather than impede the chances of successful transition from violent conflict to peace by adopting policies that promote inequalities.
- ***The presence of a weak state creates a permissive environment to the use of violence.*** The inability of a weak state to provide goods and services created a sense of grievance (intensified and mobilized by entrepreneurs). In addition, the same state weakness-emboldened groups to take whatever resources they could grab through looting, pillaging and criminal behaviour. Building the capacity of the state is critical to overall programme implementation.

Key Orientations for Government, Donors and Civil Society

Key recommendations to Government, donors and civil society actors emanating from the Report are outlined below:

Government

- Through basic information gathering and analysis, Government should lead the development of a systematic understanding and assessment of the basic structures, dynamics, patterns and impacts of conflict during the tensions.
- Government (and major donor partners) should integrate PCDA into national planning, coordination, strategy and policy development efforts. Economic reform in particular needs to be fully cognoscente of conflict and peace issues.
- Strengthen the institutions of governance for just and equitable management of state resources, to ensure access and participation, and to communicate policies. Conflict/social impact sensitive rural development and investment policies and strategies should also be established.

- Provide the legal and administrative framework to support customary land allocation and management systems. Systematic follow-up should also be undertaken on the establishment of a land tribunal. Prevention of future violence should focus on managing land conflicts through non-violent ways.
- Transitional justice mechanisms should be considered, within the context of efforts to effectively address tensions between traditional and non-traditional systems that have been identified as key permissive spaces for violent conflict.

Donors

- Donors should consider the conflict (social) impacts of their work in Solomon Islands in developing their country strategies. As the underlying causes of the violent conflict have not been fully addressed, the precautionary principle should be applied to all donors programming.
- Donors should carry out peace and conflict development analysis at the project level – especially in areas touching on core conflict themes such as land, traditional vs. non-traditional authority structures, access to, government services, public Resources and information, economic opportunity, and law and justice.
- Donors should integrate peacebuilding aims within current governance support efforts in Solomon Islands. This should include educating public authorities on roles and responsibilities, strengthening and expanding anti-corruption institutions to counter possible future “conflict entrepreneurs” and court watch programmes.
- In order to prevent undermining capacity, enhancing frustrations, and become part of conflict cycles, donors should ensure that standards and verifiable codes of conduct are developed for expatriate officials and advisors.

Civil Society

- The weak civil society base in the Solomon Islands needs to be addressed in order to ensure Government and donor partnerships and decision making processes, are appropriately developed, framed and implemented through a peacebuilding lens.
- Civil Society needs to engage the private sector and enact regulations to prevent factors that may lead to future conflict such as corruption, unfettered exploitation of resources, clashes with traditional systems etc. Positive roles should be fully exploited such as job creation, social impact sensitive labour policies, and ensuring benefits of operations encompass fairly local landowners, government and the business itself.
- Traditional leaders and communities should seek a broad and common understanding and awareness of basic principles of customary land law in their villages as the basis for allocation of resources among those with traditional resource rights. Dispute resolution systems should be strengthened.

CORE ISSUES AND PERCEPTIONS AFFECTING PEACE AND CONFLICT

Overview

1. This report is based on a review of existing documents, and a process of extensive consultation with a very wide range of individuals and organizations with a broad spectrum of interests and views. Within these two sources of information, many different factors were labelled as root causes of the Tensions in Solomon Islands.

2. Some of these causes appear to be **structural** in nature, such as uneven development and the mal-distribution of public resources, or high youth population and high growth rate leading to high underemployment and lack of educational opportunity. Other causes appear to be **permissive factors** that allowed, or at least did not stop, the use of violence, such as the absence of effective mechanisms for non-violent conflict management that might be found in police/courts, and absence of traditional and spiritual leadership and conflict management. Some causes appear to be **proximate or triggering factors** such as the escalating and ignored claims for compensation by “Indigenous Guadalcanal People” from the National Government leading to the final protest in 1998 which provoked armed threats and expulsions of Malaitans in and around Honiara. Still others are more clearly **perpetuating or exacerbating factors** such as the availability of high-powered weapons following raids on armouries in Auki and Honiara.


3. This leads to a long list of different causes of conflict – or points of tension - that erupted into violence in 1998. However, when reviewed these causes/ stresses are also a variety of different (but related) kinds of conflict that tend to be lumped under the general label of “Ethnic Tensions.” This includes conflicts concerning land ownership, use and the distribution of benefits generated by land; control of political power; human poverty; ethnicization¹, access to, or use of, natural resources; and settler-indigenous relations; economic competition, and so on. The longest list of conflict issues prepared for Solomon Islands identifies well over 100 “Dividers,” depending on how one organizes them (LCP 2001).

4. In consultation with over 300 people representing government, donors, private sector, and non-government organizations and community representatives, five themes were identified again and again (See Diagram 1) as core issues affecting peace and conflict in the Solomon Islands. They are:

- Land
- Traditional versus Non-Traditional Authority Structures
- Access to Information, Government Services and Public Resources
- Economic Opportunity
- Law and Justice

¹ “Ethnicization” refers to the ways in which identities may be politicised by political or conflict entrepreneurs. It is not “ethnic” identity per se that is a “problem” but the way it may be manipulated so that, for example competition for employment or land come to be framed as “ethnic” in origin, rather than economic or demographic

5. These were identified by stakeholders as the issues having the most profound impact on the patterns and intensity of conflict – including the process by which non-violent conflicts turn violent. Not only are these integral to understanding the root causes of the 1998-2003 Tensions but it also became apparent that they form the basis of understanding structural and proximate causes of conflicts that have occurred since colonial times. As the main sources of, or irritants to, violence in Solomon Islands, they should constitute the central referents to policy, programming, and development initiatives. Put simply, the guiding PCDA



question for all initiatives is this: how is my initiative going to affect these core peace and conflict issues?

Core Inter-Related Peace and Conflict Factors

6. Consultations continuously identified linkages between land, traditional and non-traditional systems, law and justice, economic opportunity, and access to government services/public resources/ information. The purpose of this section is to further elaborate on these themes as they relate to conflict generation or peace building.

LAND

“Does the concept of ‘ownership’ apply to customary land? In reality the opposite seems true: that it is the land that owns the people. This is because it pre-dates human existence, it provides for human livelihood during his life and claims his body at death”
— *A Solomon Islander quoted in (SILJSISP 2003: 7)*

7. No conversation about peace and conflict in Solomon Islands can progress more than a minute or two, at most, before the question of land is thrust to the front of the line of factors affecting violent conflict. As the quote above illustrates, in Solomon Islands there is an intimate, perhaps inseparable, relationship between individual identity, group allegiances, and land. It is little wonder then that with land being of such fundamental importance in Solomon Islands that passions with regard to it should run so high.

Accordingly, it has been estimated that between 70% and 90% of local court work is dealing with customary land appeals (SILJSISP 2003: 5).

8. It is estimated that 90% of all land in Solomon Islands is customary land governed by current customary usage. Land ownership in Solomon Islands rests with tribal groups. There is no individual ownership except for some 4,300 sq. km described as “alienated” land, practically all of it held under registered title. About two thirds of alienated land is owned by the government, and one third by Solomon Islanders. Alienated land tends to be the better (i.e., higher “value”) coastal land. The ownership and use of the remaining 90% of the land area is regulated according to customs, which vary from place to place.

9. Land tenure in a Melanesian context is highly complex. It is an expression of social relationships as related to land and is expressed as rights to exploit resources. Allocation of rights to use customary land is determined by social relationships, some through blood and others deriving from historical associations. There is customary land law but, since it derives from localised culture groups, it is not standard for the whole country, or even within a province. Land is regulated by rules but knowledge and understanding of these rules is sometimes fading and at other times undercut by the decreasing authority of landowner structures and options for resolving disputes. This increases differences in interpretation and hence disputes arise.

... disputes are seen as a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, source of conflict. It is argued that while land disputes have remained constant over time, it is the break down in customary management practices, in particular non-violent conflict management and dispute resolution, that is the critical (and lethal) ingredient explaining why land disputes have become violent.

10. The following land-related issues were identified repeatedly as flash points in the conflicts leading to violence during the Tensions:

- Unauthorized sale of customary land by a few, self-interested, individuals;
- The unequal distribution of rent income/royalties from land; and
- Illegal squatting on, and use of, customary lands, particularly around Honiara.

11. Friction has been increased by elements within the government who have pandered to foreign companies (and enriched themselves) while marginalizing local communities who see others benefiting from the exploitation of their own resources.

12. However, two particularly awkward questions arise from a focus on Land as a “root cause” of the tensions: (1) If there have always been stresses and disputes over land, why hasn’t violent conflict been constant over time; and more interestingly (2) why is it that even at the same point in time – the Tensions, 1998-2003 – there are variations in the patterns and levels of violence at different locations in Solomon Islands? That is, if land disputes are omnipresent in Solomon Islands, why are some parts of the country more violent and other parts less violent?

Traditional dispute practices are not recognized or sanctioned by legislation except insofar as the Land and Titles Act provides for local courts to resolve disputes over land. However, this introduced system of dispute resolution has had the effect of marginalising the roles of traditional leaders. Clans still rely fundamentally on their traditional leaders to resolve disputes. Complicating this has been an acculturation process since independence in which the clan traditional systems are struggling to adopt new innovations in dealing with disputes.

13. While this question is taken up more systematically below, at this stage it is sufficient to note that answers to these questions push us to examine how and why non-violent land disputes became more intense, and prone to violence. The following factors contribute to this process.

Land boundaries, ownership, and use

14. The way land is interwoven into belief systems make issues surrounding it extremely complex. People's rights to the land are not recorded in a written deed as in

Box 1. Statutory and local frameworks

Two statutory instruments impact on land ownership issues. The Land and Titles Act of 1996 provides a system for registration of alienated land. The Customary Land Records Act of 1994 provides for the recording of customary land boundaries. The latter Act ultimately has its focus on the registration of recorded customary land under the Land and Title Act. The process of recording provides an avenue for land to be managed as alienated land regulated under the Land and Titles Act.

Within the statutory framework, customary land disputes are in the first instance referred to local courts if a party disputes a traditional leaders ruling. The matter is heard de novo in the local court. There is a right of an appeal to the Customary Land Appeal Court. The ruling of the Appeal Court is final, save for jurisdictional issues.

Most customary land is owned collectively by a clan or sub-clan. No individual has a right of alienation. All individuals have categories of rights to use the land. It is sometimes convenient to refer to these as 'primary' and 'secondary rights' where the primary rights holders are those who are born into the clan that collectively owns the land and the secondary rights holders are individuals of other clans but who have rights to use that land " though without a right to decide how the land is used. The use of these terms oversimplifies the situation and this calls for local investigation and documentation. Rights over land vary from place to place and sometimes from clan to clan, but follow a core set of comparable principles.

Land disputes are addressed in the first instance by specialist traditional leaders that are knowledgeable and skilled in dispute resolution. Acclaimed leaders enjoy the respect and popular endorsement of the clan to undertake this work. These leaders adjudicate over disputing claims through a public hearing within the clan. Based on application of customary principles and rules, and applying them to the facts of the case, a judgement is made which by virtue of the leader's status is respected.

the 'Western System'. Rather, they depend on their membership and place within a tribe or line and on the custom and history of that line or tribe and its interactions with its neighbours, with regard to acquisition, disposal or transference of any one of those rights. In an oral tradition, such as largely pertains in Solomon Islands; there can also be disagreements as to these family histories, which have a direct bearing on the rights to land. (SAILJSISP 2003: 7). Further complicating this issue is the fact customary practice is constantly evolving and changing. People have always fought over land. However, conflicts are more likely to occur with increasing pressures (discussed below) — at a time when the knowledge of what governs peoples rights and ties to the land is under

pressure from a decline or differing interpretations in the oral tradition and systems.

The Commodification and Commercialization of Land

15. In Solomon Islands, land is central to life. It has always had a traditional role, but now the demands of the modern age are being felt. There are new roles for the land and the resources. The land (and what is in it and on it) can help to fuel an economy. It can produce cash, which will pay for education, and health and create wealth. However, in an economy as constricted as that in Solomon Islands,² particularly since the Tensions, the acute shortage of cash needed for essentials (kerosene, soap, petrol, school fees) has increasingly pushed people to commodify and commercialize land.

16. In many cases, it is the desire for economic gain that pushes individuals into the commercialization of land. In other cases, this is compelled by motivations of self-interest (made easier in a permissive environment of rapid change or conflict) at the expense of the larger community as when a self-described chief makes a personally enriching arrangement with a logging company on land for which he has no legitimate representative claim.

17. 'Development' and population increase puts pressure on the land. It may introduce different and competing sets of value on the same parcel of land. For some it comes to be viewed in economic terms, while for others it is valued according to traditional

² Between 1998 and 2003, the economy shrunk 26% according to the Asia Development Bank (2003)

practices, cultural identity and integrity. It may also be viewed according political interests (for example, as a block of votes for a forthcoming election) (SAILJSISP 2003: 8).

Rapid population growth and land pressure

18. Guadalcanal's natural resources (agricultural, mineral etc.) have combined to attract large numbers of immigrants from other islands, especially from nearby Malaita. The bulk of that movement has been into the national capital, Honiara. The fact that Guadalcanal offers the best economic opportunity for government and also individuals in terms of creating investment and wealth has increased that tendency for movement. Guadalcanal has the most valuable and extensive agricultural land in Solomon Islands - the plains -and as a result has seen an influx of people from every corner of the country. Honiara's growth must also be seen in the context of a national population that has been increasing at an annual rate of about 3.5% since the early 1970s (though this has reduced in the 1986-1999 Census to 2.8 per cent). This has been due to a combination of high fertility levels and improved medical facilities. Death rates and infant-mortality rates are steadily falling, and life expectancy has shot up to over 61 years (from only 54 in the late 1980s)³. If the current population growth rate is maintained, the national population will double in 20 years.

Poor management of rapid urban growth (particularly in and around Honiara)

19. The increasing rate of migration to Honiara had, by 1991, resulted in 11% of the population of Solomon Islands residing in the capital. Those settlers began to live outside of the bounds given to them by the landowners, who had seized the opportunity to sell land and make quick bonuses in response to the demands made by the settlers. Settlers themselves often exacerbated this situation by their interpretation of occupancy rights. This resulted in friction between the landowners themselves and between and amongst the settlers. The government, the province and landowners were caught unprepared as to how to manage this changing tenure system and create orderly development (UN 2000).

Box 2: Solomon Islands Constitutional Reform Project

Expectations of "state" government are running high and there is a prevailing assumption that a new [federal] system of government will 'make things right' again. Good governance can happen in both centralized and decentralized systems. The secret of success is how *different* levels of government can best work together to achieve common objectives and ensure public accountability... The volatile political climate in the Solomon Islands and poor governance makes reform both critical and complex. Getting the process and timing 'right' could contribute to stabilization and recovery. Getting it 'wrong' could result in an escalation of civic unrest and an increase in people's vulnerability

- *Comments in Solomon Islands Constitutional Reform project: Socio-economic study of the implications of decentralization. January 2003*

³ Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2002

TRADITIONAL VERSUS NON-TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURES

“Land itself is not a “problem”. The problem arises when land comes to be identified as a root cause of [violent] conflict. This immediately limits our focus to land [in a very physical sense] and the disputes over land – and distracts our attention from the break down of the traditional means of resolving disputes, and from [the ways] traditional rules have been displaced by alien rules.” — Participant in the *PCDA Justice Focus Group*.

20. The view expressed in the quote above runs against the grain of most conventional understandings of the sources of violent conflict in Solomon Islands – that land itself is not a “root cause” of violent conflict. From this perspective, land disputes are seen as a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, source of violent conflict. It is argued that while land disputes have remained constant over time, it is the break down in customary and government management, in particular non-violent conflict management and dispute resolution, that is the critical (and lethal) ingredient that explains why land disputes have increasingly become violent. This propensity must be coupled with the changed scale of violence reflecting the tools used to perpetuate it.

21. The implications of this view are profound because it suggests that any effort at conflict reduction or resolution that focuses narrowly on land itself – its registration, commoditisation, commercialisation, over-exploitation, use, sale, and so on – may actually ‘miss the point.’ Further, it raises the possibility that narrow land-focused initiatives may actually have a conflict-generating impact. In a violence-prone setting, the results may be explosive. For example, while the goal of legally registering customary land

may (or may not) be noble, the means by which this is achieved will determine the levels of inevitable and unavoidable violence that will be generated.

Box 3. Creative rather than routine

How can we think creatively about alleviating the clash between traditional and non-traditional structures of authority? For example, rather than pursue an approach to land conflict, which includes privatization and further alienation of customary land, (including land ownership by foreigners), how can we build on the natural strengths of existing customary land tenure. A useful, positive, example, are the efforts under way to legally register customary land with clear boundaries, genealogies and land trusts. It is proposed that this will initially be a voluntary process supported by a strong Solomon Island information awareness programme

22. The clash between traditional and non-traditional authority structures is by no means limited to land issues. This was a concern that was evident regardless of the sector under consideration. While this is particularly evident in the tensions and overt violence over land (ownership, access, distribution of resources), it is equally central to questions concerning evolving education and training issues (such as the debate over the teaching

of traditional customs and skills versus the use of standard Western curricula), government capacity at the provincial and rural levels, and fractured law and justice systems.

23. This raises the following proposition: If this is true, then we should see higher levels of violence in areas where traditional mechanisms have weakened or broken down. And conversely, we should see lower levels of violence in areas where traditional mechanisms are strong. While there would seem to be anecdotal support for this assertion, it has yet to be empirically verified.



If this is true, then we should see higher levels of violence in areas where traditional mechanisms have weakened or broken down. And conversely, we should see lower levels of violence in areas where traditional mechanisms are strong.

24. It would be a mistake however, to create the impression that decisions generated through traditional structures are necessarily always preferable or more appropriate than those generated by non-traditional structures. Aside from the difficulty in determining which traditional structure is legitimate and appropriate, there are instances where “non-traditional” mechanisms appear to support outcomes that are more just and equitable, for example, where the principle of the “Best Interests of the Child” would challenge a system that would leave a widow and children destitute because the dead father’s family is permitted to take ownership of all property and chattel.

The Mutation and Manipulation of Traditional Practices of Reconciliation

25. Within the cultures of Melanesia there is a central place for the concept and practice of “compensation” for an individual or group that has been wronged. At times, this was represented by a symbolic exchange of shell Money, or of livestock such as pigs, or of an amount of actual money determined through legitimate traditional authorities.

26. However, one of the obvious consequences of violent conflict in Solomon Islands (particularly during the Tensions) has been an extortionate inflation and monetization of compensation claims. At times, this appears to be a mutation or manipulation of a traditional practice, rather than a specific clash between the traditional and non-traditional (unless the monetization of society, economy and politics is viewed – not unreasonably - as part of the assault by a non-traditional capitalist system on traditional structures and processes).

27. This was evident in the terrorization of villagers and compensation demands by Militants and Special Constables (criminalization masking as compensation); this was evident in the compensation payment of US\$ 1.6 million by the government in 2000 to get the MEF to the negotiating table; and it is evident in the long-standing compensation demands by indigenous Guadalcanal landowners for the development of the national capital on their island, and for unresolved questions of land ownership and squatting by migrant Malaitans.

28. This development poses obstacles to a sustainable movement towards reconciliation and peace. The reconciliation – or at least dispute resolution - that flows from compensation processes within traditional systems applied to local contexts and personal relationships has been shown to have been an effective means of traditional conflict management.

29. There has been, however, only limited success at scaling this up beyond the community levels in Solomon Islands. Moreover, even if the government or donors could meet all of the compensation claims by all groups, or carrying out types of traditional reconciliation with external support, none of the underlying issues will have been dealt with, and the very involvement of external players may reduce the perceived legitimacy of the exercise.

ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT SERVICES, PUBLIC RESOURCES AND INFORMATION

30. The capacity and track record of National and Provincial Governments to deliver services (and to thereby win public confidence) are expressed bluntly in a recent Report:

“The public sector has not delivered adequate services because of a failure at both national and sub-national levels to effectively fulfil the core government functions of revenue administration, public expenditure management, and public administration, and because of the poor performance of SOEs [State-Owned Enterprises] in the electricity, water, transport and telecommunications sectors. Improving the performance of central and provincial administrations and public utilities will be fundamental to generating higher living standards, especially in rural areas.” (ADB 2004)

31. Access is a theme that cuts across all sectors and can be wide ranging in its negative and positive impacts. In restricting or controlling access to government services, public resources and information communities are either divided or co-opted, leader’s authority structures may be undermined and people frustrated and misinformed.

Box 4: The Uneven Distribution of Educational Opportunity

Innumerable historical cases can be identified where ethnic groups – and social groups more broadly - have been denied access to educational resources and, therefore, excluded from full participation in the economic and social life of a country. Such obstacles have both an immediate and longer-term impact on the socio-economic status of the “affected groups.” Because education has increasingly become a highly valued commodity, its unequal allocation has been a serious source of friction that has frequently led to confrontation. It also shows how the powers of the state can become “ethnicized,” that is, used to advance the interests of one group at the expense of others. However, we have also seen the opposite version of this phenomenon, where it is the high numbers of unemployed graduates rather than high numbers of youth unable to access education, that have created a pool of frustrated and disenchanting individuals who become the militants or guerrilla protestors (as with the insurrections in Sri Lanka in 1971, and from 1987-90).
Bush & Saltarelli 2000

32. With a centralization of government services, employment opportunities, access to information, and development/ investment opportunities focused in Honiara and provincial centres the isolation and disparity between the “haves and have nots” is increasingly apparent. This has resulted - over time - in the politicization of grievances between provinces.⁴

33. The current development priorities under RAMSI are machinery of government, accountability and economic reform. Yet this approach would appear to have a very centralized and Government focus. Albeit necessary as a stopgap measure, and to build a strong foundation for economic governance, it has the potential in the longer term to further exacerbate tensions between the urban and rural areas.

Box 5: UNDP-SIG Isabel Province Development Project Strengthening Local Governance for Effective Service Delivery and Conflict Prevention

This project is a pilot initiative aimed at providing an integrated provincial planning and development approach in Isabel. It is envisaged that a five year Provincial Development Plan will be developed in consultation with a range of community actors including the Provincial Government, Church and Council of Chiefs. Priority will be on matching local capability, customs and resources with good governance, sustainable resource use, and equitable access to basic services, gender equity, and human rights. As part of this process an assessment will be carried out as to why development projects in the past have failed, drawing lessons from this and using this information in future planning activities. It is proposed that the relationship between the Isabel Council of Chiefs, the Church of Melanesia and the Provincial Government will be the basis of a legally valid “tripod” in order to practically address governance issues in the Province, which is effectively linked to village communities. The project is still in its early days but if all goes well the “tripod arrangement” has the makings of a locally owned framework for peacebuilding - ensuring that development projects and investor activities are assessed in terms of their potential impacts, are well targeted and do not exacerbate the potential for community tensions.

34. Lack of information on central or provincial government initiatives, policies or programmes in rural areas does appear to result in rumour and raised expectations. For example “access to land” and the impact of rural - urban migration on peri-urban settlements, have a significant impact on people’s perceptions around “access”, the rights to use land in a

⁴ Noteworthy by its absence, is hard reliable data with which to compare popular perceptions and empirical realities concerning the allocation of public and private resources (such as government services, private investment).

particular way and the rights to ownership, and inevitably the equitable distribution of resources and subsequent benefits.

35. On another level the access to government decision makers – and understanding how the system works (or how to work the system), how to have a voice, how to assure benefits, and how to have expectations and concerns addressed, is another area of apparent and real tension between urban and rural populations. A similar comment would seemingly apply to RAMSI.

36. This estrangement is especially critical in Solomon Islands (as in many small Island States) where the following factors are significant:

- Remoteness of islands making communication, information dissemination and distribution of government services such as health and education, extremely difficult.
- Poor communications – currently no country wide newspaper or radio coverage, transportation infrastructure weak, and little financial resources to access existing means of communication.
- Shortage of qualified people – and a tendency for these people to migrate to urban settlements or in some cases overseas. The resultant weak education and medical services – and under-qualified personnel - in rural areas are one aspect of this “brain drain”.
- Small population – affecting natural economies of scale in terms of countrywide government investment in infrastructure. For example, secondary school facilities are centralized at specific centres in each province resulting in the need for children to travel and often board away from their families. This further impacts on the social breakdown in communities, the dislocation of youth and the weakening of traditional values.
- Diverse cultures, beliefs and languages. This impacts on the unity of the country as a whole with cultural and ethnic frictions within communities, villages, districts and provinces. Addressing this in an equitable way and ensuring all groups have the same access to government services, whilst appreciating and acknowledging cultural differences, is a challenge.
- Dependence on foreign aid, lack of ownership and appropriate timelines. Tendency for projects to be donor or investment-driven whilst supposedly addressing access issues. But undertaken in a non-participatory and “quick – fix” way without analysing the local inter-relationships, needs and structures to ensure sustainability.
- Accessibility issues are even more critical where (as in Solomon Islands) there is low literacy and education levels and people feel estranged from a Western imposed non-traditional and centralized bureaucracy and their decision makers.

Box 6: Limited Access to Education

In Solomon Islands a significant proportion of school age children fall outside of the formal education system, due primarily to accessibility issues such as isolation, lack of transportation, affordability and a strong social bias towards educating males. Solomon Islands has one of the lowest school enrolment rates, which has contributed, to the country having one of the lowest literacy rates in the Pacific.¹ Adult literacy rates are very low but have increased from 22% in 1992 to 30%. Only 75% of primary school-age children are at school, 14% in secondary school and 5% in tertiary level institutions. Literacy rates for females are estimated to be as low as 17%. (UN 2000)

37. It is interesting to compare colonial and post-colonial capacities of the State. As noted in the introductory discussion of the patterns of conflict in Solomon Islands, there were

social movements and organized expressions of political dissent and demands for increased political autonomy. The colonial state however, was a “strong state”⁵ that was able to stop dissent from “getting out of hand.” This is clearly pacification rather than peace. It did not address the critical issues and concerns underpinning dissent, but only swept them under the carpet to simmer away for another time to erupt. As with many newly independent countries, the post-colonial state of Solomon Islands differed substantively from its predecessor in its autonomy and capacity to act decisively. Being unwilling or unable to suppress long-simmering discontent, the likelihood of grievances being expressed through violence was heightened.

38. In other words, the presence of a weak state created a permissive environment for violence. Further, as discussed below, (1) the inability of a weak state to provide goods and services created a sense of grievance (intensified and mobilized by entrepreneurs) and (2) the same state weakness emboldened groups to take whatever resources they could grab through looting, pillaging and criminal behaviour. There was, in other words the high voltage connection made between grievance, greed and opportunity.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

39. Prior to the Tensions, the Solomon Islands was making modest gains in health, education and public infrastructure. In 1998 the estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP), including subsistence production, was SI\$341.3 million (US\$70.8 million) in real terms, based on 1985 prices. However, the national data discussed differs between urban and rural areas and different parts of the country. The inflation rate stood at 14-15% in mid-2002 and is projected to continue to rise rapidly.

Box 7: Economic Costs of the Conflict⁶.

- Exports of palm oil and palm oil products fell from SI\$97.9 million in 1998 to SI\$65.1 million in 1999 and subsequently to an estimated SI\$6.5 million in 2000 before production ceased altogether in that year.
- Fish export revenue, which suffered as a result of low prices and civil unrest, sank from SI\$195 million in 1999 to SI\$45 million in 2000. This sectors contribution to GDP fell by an estimated 42 per cent in 2000.
- Agricultural output dropped by over 50 per cent from the beginning of 1999 to the end of 2000.
- Other key sectors in the economy, such as logs, copra, and cocoa suffered as a result of the disturbances, although they all continued to export in June 2000.
- Gold from the Gold Ridge mine on Guadalcanal had begun to make a significant contribution to exports before the mine was closed in June 2000.
- Rapid decline in economic growth - in 2000, GDP declined by 14 percent.
- Infrastructure damage estimated at over SI\$250 million (equivalent to 20 per cent of Solomon Islands GDP).
- The government experienced acute cash flow difficulties as tax revenues plummeted and external assistance was suspended.
- A significant increase in overseas debt incurred through loans taken out for repatriation payments to former militants and compensation to victims of the unrest.
- Disruption of economic activity placed severe strains on the delivery of Government services throughout the country.

40. The economy of the Solomon Islands shrank by 26% during the tensions. As many as 10,000 people previously employed by Solomon Islands Plantation Limited (SIPL) palm oil plantations, logging companies in Guadalcanal and Western Provinces, Gold Ridge Mines and Solomon Taiyo Ltd (STL) were laid off their jobs, and many

⁵ That is, the colonial state possessed the autonomy and capacity to act decisively, and to control outcomes.

⁶ Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002

forced to return to their villages (discussed further below). The macro-economic importance of SIPL and Gold Ridge is reflected in the fact that they constituted 20% and 25% of the country's exports, respectively, in 1999.

41. In the Solomon Islands, 84% of people living in rural areas engage in subsistence production; 41.5% of the population is under the age of 14 with 45% of these children not able to attend school, where 84% of rural households have a monthly income of less than SI\$50 and of the total population over the age of 14 years only 23% are in paid employment (UNDP 2002). Human poverty remains a concern for most Solomon Islanders. Human development is not just about individual or household income, but an inability to meet basic needs, including access to basic primary education, and healthcare and where opportunities to participate in economic, social, civil and political life are seriously limited.

42. Large-scale economic activity and government revenue have been largely dependent on the primary exporting sector. Given fragile international markets and low world prices, coupled with potential difficulties arising in sustaining the forestry industry, this may be difficult to continue in the longer term especially if reliant on external investment, alienation of land and internal migration.


43. The critical issue for the predominantly rural population in the Solomon Islands is ensuring their share of the economic resources of the country in order that they can educate their children and develop sustainable livelihood opportunities building on traditional subsistence practices. The solution is not just in abandoning the traditional small-scale subsistence practices for large-scale plantations, but improving the village economy through increasing yields, exploring different varieties, supporting rural agricultural advisors and improving access to markets.

44. With a 2.8% annual population growth rate (UN Common Country Assessment, 2002) the challenge will be to find mechanisms for satisfactory and realistic employment opportunities for the future youth of the country, and ensuring they have the appropriate training and skills to undertake this. Employment opportunities need to be decentralized, capacity strengthened and ownership (from central policy making to the village councils) assured.

45. Forests have provided between 20% and 35% of the Solomon Island's foreign exchange earnings and in 1990 the forest industry became the largest export revenue earner. The rate of harvesting of the forests is expected to increase and has caused widespread concern. The 1990s witnessed a period of economic exploitation, particularly by logging companies that made a few rich at the expense of the majority. Businesses, especially logging companies and those closely associated with them, were subsidised by government at the expense of rural based development activities. Furthermore throughout the Tensions there was an increase in illegal logging activities

Box 8: Welcome Criticism of RAMSI: The benefits of a small economic footprint

A local business owner in Honiara complained that his shops were not benefiting from the influx of RAMSI police and military personnel. This contrasts with the large and dislocating "economic foot print" usually associated with the presence of foreign missions, especially the United Nations (e.g., Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo). While the flood of non-military, non-police ex-pats is blamed for supply and demand distortions in Honiara the RAMSI distortive impact on the local economy seems to be relatively small. This is said to be the result of the decision by RAMSI to bring with it most of the goods and services needed to sustain its personnel. Though this puts limits on local procurement, the net impact is positive.



Any programme is doomed to fail if it is premised on the belief that even nominal cash contributions to access a service will entice community buy-in. So, for example, any move away from free drug programmes, will only result in increased illness and death – and grease the linkages between deprivation, frustration, and violence. In the realm of education, this suggests the need for moving towards universally accessible education in accordance with the Convention of the Rights of Child.

(UN 2000), with a now continued and legal extraction rate that exceeds sustainable forestry rates. The rights of indigenous owners to the utilisation of these resources must balance natural resource extraction.

46. What happens when a peace and conflict lens is applied to this rather static, conventional, description of economic decline during and after the Tensions? First, that violent conflict has a measurable negative impact on the economy (even while certain individuals may reap direct economic benefits whether through looting and gangsterism, or through bribes and the self-aggrandizing schemes of corrupt politicians and business figures).⁷ However, as we begin to look closer through the PCDA lens, we also begin to see that rebuilding the economic foundations of peace requires more than re-opening the industries closed down in the wake of violence because they are themselves implicated in creating the conditions that led to the outbreak of violence in the first place.

47. It is not uncommon, for example, to hear it argued that the economic future of Solomon Islands lies in the re-opening of the Gold Ridge mine and the vast oil palm and cocoa plantations in Guadalcanal. Yet it was the land and labour of these economic activities that helped set the state for the politicisation of ethnicities.⁸ “Guadalcanal land owners who used to grow rich on subsistence gold mining, suddenly discovered, after their small royalties were paid by the gold mine, that they could no longer practice subsistence gold mining on their customary land. They also resented the well-educated Malaitans running the mine – who reported that the mine was also secretly producing silver, undisclosed to the Solomon Islands Government. Further, customary land ownership of the mine is still disputed by Weather Coast Guadalcanal people who seek to exert their claims. The same is true of the vast plantations. Now Guadalcanal people are doing subsistence harvesting of the cocoa plantations directly receiving much of the revenue. Though the price of cocoa is still high – “they have nothing to gain from the plantation system being reimposed” (Brown 2003). Indeed, they have a disincentive to move off plantations, as it would carry negative financial implications, and re-introduce the demand for labour, which would likely include large numbers of the “scapegoat” Malaitans. However, in the absence of foreign owners, idle plantations can exacerbate tensions between competing community lands claims.

48. There is clearly a correlation between private investment and development flows and actual or perceived imbalances or inequities, and violent conflict. Certainly more work needs to be done in order to avoid understand the role of economic grievances

Box 9. Corruption and Economic Reform

During the extensive consultations undertaken for the formulation of NERRDP, respondents frequently expressed concern over corruption, misuse of public funds, discretionary tax and duty exemptions, non-adherence to existing rules and procedures, and political appointments to the civil service. Corruption is widely acknowledged to be pervasive and ingrained and its removal will require top-level political commitment and a long-term process of strengthening key governance institutions, reforming the public service, and educating the public. Freedom of the media is guaranteed by the Solomon Islands constitution, and generally has been exercised. - ADB 2004

and perceptions in creating conflict, in order to find out how the choice is made to pursue violence. Unless the critical issues of ensuring equitable distribution of resources, and increasing economic opportunities whilst protecting traditional livelihood practices are addressed - in a satisfactory way - there will be potential for further unrest in the future.

49. The term “economic reform” has recently been introduced as one of the “three core areas” of RAMSI

⁷ See soon-to-be released Transparency International report on Corruption in the Solomon Islands.

⁸ This section draws directly from Brown (2003) as well as from conversations with Bishop Terry Brown in Auki. 3 March 2004.


support in the coming year. Indeed, there have been frequent references to the need for economic reform in Solomon Islands. If inappropriate blue print approaches to economic rebuilding are to be avoided, then the question: What does “economic reform” really mean? Must be answered.

50. The question in the current context is this: What does “economic reform” really mean in a country where less than five percent of the population is employed in the formal sector of the economy (Australian DFAT 2003)? What does “economic reform” mean in a near-subsistence, cash-starved, economy where 85% of the population spends what little hard cash it has on either school fees, or increasingly expensive necessities like, kerosene, petrol and soap – bearing in mind (by some estimates), a 42% decrease in the value of the SI dollar over the last two years (ADB 2003)? This same question needs to be asked (answered) with reference to the recent MOU between the SIG and ADB which “aims at achieving rapid, pro-poor and private sector-led economic growth through support in (i) providing transportation infrastructure and services; and (ii) strengthening the enabling environment for the private sector.

51. “Economic reform” has been applied to every country in the world at some time or another. This usually refers to a prescriptive set of neo-liberal measures endorsed by International Financial Institutions (such as the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, or the International Monetary Fund). Whether or not these measures work in the long term (ref. The economic disintegration of Argentina) they often cause immediate disruption and destabilization when existing economic institutions (including criminal networks, no less than government social programs) are dismantled.

52. According to a RAMSI official “In economic reform we will be looking at regulatory reform as it affects the business environment: what are the things we need to do to make it easier for business to operate, not just in Honiara, but also in the provinces? Not just focused on foreign investment, but also looking at local investment. We will also be looking at capacity development, not just for the Ministry of Finance, but also for the other central economic agencies and also other institutions and we will be looking at capacity building in association with other donors and with the IFIs.”

53. In addition, Ruth Liloqula argues that the heavy emphasis on economic reconstruction in the post conflict recovery process in Solomon Islands privileges economic growth over social justice and human welfare, which may lead directly to policies that promote inequalities. “The placement of the provision of basic needs before economic growth run counter to the economic polices of structural adjustment and sectoral reform with a macro perspective. It is assumed that the surplus generated will trickle down to raise the standard of living for all. The post-conflict economic polities need to promote reconstruction, rehabilitation rather than impede the chances of successful transition from conflict to peace by adopting policies that promote inequalities. The process of peace must be allowed to reshape and re-direct economic policies so that economic growth and peace can eventuate.” (Liloqula n.d.: 22) See Box 4 on the trade-offs between equality and equity illustrated by the 3000-house example in Sri Lanka.



What does “economic reform” really mean in a country where less than five percent of the population is employed in the formal sector of the economy? What does “economic reform” mean in a near-subsistence, cash-starved, economy where 85% of the population spends what little hard cash it has on either school fees, or increasingly expensive necessities like, kerosene, petrol and soap – bearing in mind (by some estimates), a 42% decrease in the value of the SI dollar over the last two years?

54. It would be a mistake not to consider the economic incentives and benefits of militarised criminalized activity during the Tensions. In areas where the State had long stopped performing state-like functions (physical security, law and order, allocation of

BOX 10: The private sector and conflict

Local and international business interests, foreign direct investment, and the private sector as a whole appear to have both positive and negative contributions to conflict and peace cycles. At the national level private sector development is widely understood to be part of the “access to resources” question that has been identified as a major contributing factor to grievance and conflict. Together with other factors, the lack of opportunity, jobs, infrastructure, and livelihoods in the provinces can be seen to contribute to a perception of isolation, deprivation and alienation, especially from Honiara. During times of tension, these resource flows dry up or divert elsewhere, limiting even further the amount of resources available locally. In the past, private sector investment focused largely on Guadalcanal coupled with natural resource exploitation is widely perceived to benefit “others” to the detriment of local owners, which enhances perceptions of imbalanced development and access to development opportunity.

Though it is widely believed that the business community has a stake in stability, certain segments of the business community, in particular the extractive industries may generate larger profits in unstable conditions. They can do this through corruption perpetuated during times of weak governance, regulation, and resource ownership rights (conditions such as exist during conflicts), by directly or indirectly funding political processes, by legally and illegally bringing in external labor (ensuring that the benefits of operations have little impact locally). “Conflict entrepreneurs”, including local and international interests as well as those in regulatory positions in Government are widely believed by the business community itself to have fuelled and perpetuated the tensions for financial gain. Positive contributions of business include: job creation, sensitive labor policies, ensuring benefits of operations includes local landowners, government and the business itself. As an actor local business leaders can affect change, reach the ears of government, and can use their status to speak out against abuses and problems.

Policies to move economic development and investment beyond Guadalcanal — in a manner that does not create tensions between local communities and outside actors — will need to focus on infrastructure, facilitating access to markets, and land use policy.

public goods and services), combined with perceptions of high level political corruption, pillaging and criminality became a way for disenchanting groups to lay claim to resources by virtue of their possession of High Powered Weapons. In other instances the judgement was made that access to finance and wealth might better be pursued through violence, extortion, exploitation and other avenues.

55. PCDA supports the NERRDP and other planning instruments by offering a way to systematically and explicitly integrate peace and conflict issues into government planning and programming. This support is particularly timely given that the drafting of an action plan for the implementation of the NERRDP is

currently under way. Post-conflict planning and programming in Solomon Islands that does not explicitly integrate peace and conflict sensitivity risks ignoring — and thereby risks re-igniting — the tensions and conflicts that underpinned the eruption of violence of 1998-2003.

LAW AND JUSTICE

56. The label “Law and Justice” encompasses a very broad range of peace and conflict development issues. It includes everything from law enforcement at the local level, to the administration of justice (from the Local Courts through to the High Court and the Court of Appeal), to competing understandings of, and approaches to, social justice and national unity and reconciliation, to issues of corruption and parasitic politicians.


57. According to a legal advisor interviewed for this report there is a dispute resolution system in place, which appears to blend both traditional and non-traditional (i.e. Western) structures and processes. The system has a place for chiefs to address disputes through traditional means while including others layers of non-traditional Western courts processes. On one level, this would appear to be an example of how both systems function side-by-side. In practice however, if one of the disputing parties is not



It is impossible (and inappropriate) to suggest that either traditional or non-tradition structures are preferable — though it would be useful to have the empirical data to determine whether or not areas with strong traditional structures are less violent than those with weak traditional structures. The point here, is to emphasize the need to appreciate (and anticipate) the ways in which the clash between these systems may encourage the use of violence to resolve conflicts and disputes.

satisfied with the decision of the chief, they often appeal the decision or commence fresh proceedings in the Western court system. This illustrates the potential of such an arrangement to undercut the traditional system rather than being an example of a blended system.

58. In some cases, it appears that the potential for a violent escalation of conflict increases when two divergent systems of justice come into contact with each other. Specifically, concerns were expressed about RAMSI interventions into community level disputes that may end up “criminalizing” behaviours and incarcerating individuals for activities which would have been dealt with previously through more traditional restorative means. In addition to the social damage that may be done to the individual, the dispute underpinning the behaviour remains unaddressed and unresolved. In this case then, incarceration may be little more than a pause in an unresolved conflict through a system, which undercuts the role and potential of traditional means to bring closure to it. One example provided in the consultations for this report is that of 19-year-old boy having sexual relations with a 15-year-old girl. This would usually be dealt with traditionally. But if one of the girl’s relatives “wants more blood,” then he (sic) may bring this up in the formal court system, and the boy may spend a few years in jail, leaving open the likelihood for retribution against the girl and/or her family by the boy’s family, or by the boy himself upon release.⁹



External interventions into community level disputes ... may end up “criminalizing” behaviours and incarcerating individuals for activities, which would have been dealt with previously through more effective traditional means.

When is demilitarisation not demilitarisation?

59. According to one person interviewed for this report, the presence of military hardware in the initial RAMSI intervention far exceeded anything in the pre-RAMSI period. This was no doubt a calculated operational decision to send a message to militants that they would lose militarily if they confronted RAMSI. (As the Commander of UN Forces in Bosnia once said of UN military engagement in civil conflicts, “If you walk into a knife fight, bring a gun”). The success of this approach is evident in the disarming and demobilization of the militants, and most evident in the security and order on the streets of Honiara and those areas directly affected by the Tensions.

60. RAMSI — no less than the SIG, Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) business interests, and the donor community — recognizes that “order” is not the same as “peace.” Or that the absence of overt violence is not the same as the presence of active peace. This is the basis for the broad debate over what needs to be put in place before RAMSI leaves, to ensure that there is not a re-emergence of armed conflict. However, at the moment — as this debate takes place — there is a common feeling that while RAMSI is in Solomon Islands, it is unlikely that any group would re-launch an armed campaign. Why? Not because any of the core issues have been addressed, but because of the (reasonable) fear by prospective militants that they would suffer military defeat in the face of overwhelmingly superior

BOX 11: De-Linking Economic Necessity from Petty Corruption

Petty crime was increasing in a certain area of Solomon Islands despite the presence of a small Police post. People stopped reporting incidents because they knew from experience that the police officer posted there does not respond. Indeed, it was commonly believed that the gasoline provided for his police jeep was used instead for his fishing boat. As a result, respect for the police authority in general diminished. However, a critical piece of this story is that the policeman was often either not paid, or paid late. In this context, the use of the gasoline is not really petty corruption or theft, but rational economic necessity. Correspondingly, an appropriate response would not be a focus on the “misappropriation” of fuel, but on ensuring that structures are in place to have the police officer paid regularly — and on ensuring that they received appropriate training and support to ensure professionalism of the police force. The result would help foster police morale as well as community trust.

⁹ While the original example used RAMSI as the representative of non-traditional “European” law enforcement and justice, the same would apply to the RSIP if used in the same manner.

forces. In other words, as welcome and as necessary as order and stability are for creating the space for the building of a sustainable peace, it needs to be recognized that this space has not been demilitarised, it has been differently militarised, largely by Australian/New Zealand military personnel and police members from Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Island nations—including Tonga, Fiji, PNG, Samoa and Vanuatu. This realization was expressed eloquently in a discussion with a Government-affiliated peace organization when it was observed that in the past it had focused on taking the guns out of the hands of youth, but now it would need to take the guns out of the minds of youth.

The Elephant in the Room: Political Corruption

61. Greed and political corruption are two of the most consistent issues placed on the peace and conflict agenda. They are seen to be a major irritant in the outbreak of the Tensions, for a number of reasons: (1) by de-legitimizing democratic structures of representative government and increasing the likelihood that legitimate grievances would be expressed through violence¹⁰ (2) by diverting public monies away from the provision of public services to all citizens and thereby worsening the sense of grievance, neglect, and alienation across Solomon Islands; and, (3) by encouraging a culture of “me-first” (whether the “me” is an individual or a group), thereby contributing to disunity and unhealthy bickering and competition between groups and provinces.

62. To strengthen the “machinery of government” without strengthening the corrupt individuals that “work the machinery.” Ultimately, it is impossible to change one without changing the other. However, Solomon Islands are not unique in this regard, and there are mechanisms that have been used effectively elsewhere. A forthcoming report on Solomon Islands by Transparency International offers some much needed empirical analysis and recommendations.¹¹

63. Specifically, *Transparency International* found that three of the anti-corruption institutions in the country have been unable to perform their work adequately because of a lack of resources ranging from staffing and funding to equipment. This followed a study focusing on the Ombudsman’s Office, the Leadership Code Commission and the Auditor General’s Office. Presenting its findings at the Transparency Solomon Islands Annual General Meeting in Honiara, the Secretary of the organization, Francis Waleania, said the Auditor General’s Office was affected the worst. Waleania said the last time the Auditor General’s Office presented a report to National Parliament was in 1995.

64. Not surprisingly, the Transparency study has recommended that more resources should be allocated to these anti-corruption institutions and that the Government should give them the appropriate priority. Such findings must also reflect the long-term needs of Solomon Islands to take a holistic approach to the justice sector, which underpins many parts of an effective anti-corruption approach.



... the economic self-interests and culture of self-aggrandizement that have evolved before and during the Tensions, serve to perpetuate the potential for violence and to hinder efforts to build sustainable peace.

¹⁰ The failure of the National Government to respond to repeated demands and petitions from Gwale youth from rural Guadalcanal (particularly around Honiara) is an oft-cited example of government inaction leading to disillusionment, frustration, and ultimately to the use of violence.

¹¹ SOLOMON IS: Anti-Corruption Institutions Not Functioning, Friday: March 12, 2004 <http://www.pacificislands.cc/pm32004/>

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Solomon Islands?

65. There have been suggestions within the Solomon Islands that a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)” might be a useful mechanism for “healing and sustainable peace.” The term and concept of a TRC originated in South Africa as an indigenous mechanism to respond to the particular needs and aspirations of a population traumatized by the brutality of the apartheid regime.

66. However, this is only one of a number of different “Transitional Justice Mechanisms” that are intended to address a legacy of human rights violations in the transition from violent conflict and/or authoritarian rule to peace-time and/or democracy. These have been employed to date by states and the international community: criminal prosecutions, trans-national criminal and civil proceedings, quasi-traditional justice mechanisms, truth commissions, lustration / vetting, reparations, and amnesties.


67. The truth commissions in South Africa, Guatemala and El Salvador were three of the most widely recognised, past examples of this particular mechanism. Although not located in a typical post-conflict situation, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a unique example that has combined truth seeking with the conditional grant of amnesty.

68. These three examples offer a comparison between the international (El Salvador), mixed (Guatemala) and national (South Africa) approaches. Rwanda and East Timor are two countries that have recently attempted to combine more than one mechanism to address the problem of past human rights atrocities. Both continue to develop their transitional justice strategy, and provide insights into current trends and challenges within this field. Both have faced the particular challenge of post-conflict reconstruction in the face of extreme levels of poverty and lack of resources.

69. The proposal for a TRC for Solomon Islands should not be prematurely dismissed. However, before a decision can be made on such a proposal, there needs to be much more clarity on just what such a Transitional Justice Mechanism might look like in the Solomons. This would require a rigorous consideration of what worked and didn’t work in these other cases, and what might be appropriate for Solomon Islands (no doubt in a substantially modified form).

70. Most importantly, what currently exists in the soil of the Solomons – and the Melanesian culture — that could form the basis of such a mechanism, if indeed this is what was genuinely called for the people? And finally, any proposed TRC must be assessed through a peace and conflict lens. To what extent might it be conflict generating, rather than peacebuilding? To what extent would it undercut the authority of the chief, and thereby erode some traditional structures of authority and stability, or indeed the role and authority of the courts. How can these concerns be incorporated into its establishment, if this idea is indeed adopted? Since an amnesty has already been granted under the Townsville Peace Accord, what incentive would there be for individuals to revisit their past misdeeds?


Avoiding False and Simple Labels of Conflict in Solomon Islands



In the Solomon Islands context, the labelling of small arms as High Powered Weapons tells us more about the society into which they were introduced, and the profoundly destabilizing impact they had, than about the weapons themselves

71. Every violent conflict generates its own language and dialect to describe what is going on. In Solomon Islands, this includes the labelling of the period from 1998-2003 as “the Tensions.” Another term that punctuates discussions is “High Powered Weapons,” as in the environment was characterized by the prevalence of “High Powered Weapons.” In Solomon Islands, this much-used-but-rarely-defined term refers to military weapons which are generally called “Small Arms” in any other conflict – this includes, but is not limited to “Singaporean SR88 5.56mm assault rifles, [Belgian] FN FAL 7.62mm semi-automatic rifles, GPMG M-60 7.62mm, machine guns and older Webley revolvers” (sic) (UNDP 2003). Other weapons in circulation during the Tensions included “Commercial” weapons including .22 calibre and 12-gauge rifles. “Homemade” weapons made from water pipes and other materials use mainly .30 and .50 calibre ammunition, some of it left over from WWII. There was little evidence of grenades, although unexploded WWII ordnance posed problems, as did stolen commercial explosives.¹²

72. In the Solomon Islands context, the labelling of small arms as “High Powered Weapons” tells us more about the society into which they were introduced, and the profoundly destabilizing impact they had, than about the weapons themselves. By comparison, for example, the collective impact of one more assault rifle in an already militarised Afghani village (in conflict since 1979) is minor compared to the introduction even only one weapon in the non-militarized environments of Solomon Islands. One expatriate spoke of what they felt was a disproportionate fear by villagers of rumours of high-powered weapons entering their village. However, the level of fear should be understood not as disproportional,¹³ but as an indication of the profoundly destabilizing impact of weaponization in Solomon Islands socially, culturally, and psychologically.



... the relative lack of paramilitary institutional structure (or at least a lack of institutional consistency) suggests that the sustainability of such forces is weak because it is dependent on immediate circumstances (availability of weapons, the mobilization of grievances, specific economic conditions), and the availability of mobilizers and “conflict entrepreneurs.”

... although the sustainability of such militarised groups may be weak, the chances of these forces being mobilized again remain high unless the original precipitating circumstances are changed.

This is precisely the reason why the Solomon Islands Government, RAMSI and the donor community have set their sights on long term, structural, developmental solutions.

73. The previous section identifies a large number of conflicting interests, and an even greater number of groups in conflict. Yet not all of these groups took up violence as a means to address grievances. Indeed, relative to the number of conflict groups, only a small number became actively engaged in armed violence. This observation may turn the question of violence on its head. Perhaps the question should NOT be why was there so much violence in Solomon Islands, but why has there been there so little? An answer to this question is suggested in a comment by Lenore Hamilton which challenges an uncritical acceptance of the belief that unresolved conflict is the explosive prerequisite for violent conflict. Maybe the opposite is true. Perhaps unresolved conflict in Solomon Islands serves a violence-limiting function:

“I think it has to be said that it’s not the case that if all land issues were resolved tomorrow that masses of land would suddenly become available for ‘development.’ Not all communities want development and, at least, may be divided over what kind of development is appropriate. It could also be said – and maybe this is pushing it a bit too far – that in some cases, the unresolved nature of disputes allows things to simmer away

¹² UNDP (2003) estimates that “As of July 2003, there are between 2,640-3,520 small arms in the Solomon Islands. Among these are an estimated 1,010-1,270 illegal “high powered” and “commercial” firearms – considerably more than the 500-700 commonly reported.”

¹³ This begs the question: “disproportional” to what?

but never erupts. And so the status quo is maintained and an age old way of life continues.”¹⁴

74. One of the distinctive features of the militarised violence of the Tensions (that is, violence characterized by the use of military weapons) is that it was relatively amorphous and chaotic in some places, but structured and ordered in others. So, for example, a Senior RAMSI official described the Militant Groups as lacking “an institutional presence.” At times, this appears to have been reflected in the haphazard patterns of violence that accompanied opportunistic criminality (e.g., North Malaita). However, at other times and other places, groups appeared to be organized according to more conventional paramilitary lines with some semblance of politico-military strategy (e.g. in and around Honiara where the MEF and IFM engaged each other militarily).

Box 12: Why was gun collection so fast and effective?

It is claimed by RAMSI that within its first 100 days (working in partnership with the NPC), it collected and destroyed almost 4,000 high-powered guns and other weapons – about 700 of which were classified as “high powered” (RAMSI 2003). Other estimates range from 3400 (RAMSI management) or less (UNDP 2003). It is strongly felt that the majority of high-powered weapons are now permanently out of circulation (though rumours persist of small stashes in Solomon Islands and in Bougainville). One of the obvious questions from anyone with any experience in militarised conflict zones around the world is this: why and how were these weapons collected so quickly – since a weapon represents economic independence, social power, and status anywhere there is break down in social, political, and economic order? A number of answers were offered from a range of people during the preparation of this report.

(1) The militants were so compliant because they were not fully committed to the fight. Nor were they particularly organized or institutionalised. The weapons were made available to them by “conflict entrepreneurs” or “war lords.” Thus, the weapons were tools to the militants who were tools to the conflict entrepreneurs.

(2) The arrest of the major high profile warlords – the most notorious, Harold Keke of Guadalcanal’s Weather Coast and Jimmy Rasta – as well a major crack down on police (arresting those allegedly involved in theft, rape, intimidation, and physical attacks, while dismissing the incompetent and insubordinate) has reduced the need for people to keep weapons for self-defence.

(3) Shortly after RAMSI’s arrival, stories began circulating about supernatural (or high tech) powers to detect stolen property and high powered weapons — e.g., stories of RAMSI’s use of unmanned drones that could see through the roofs of houses and under the ground to detect weapons.

(4) NPC councillors toured all of the provinces to inform people of the gun amnesty and collect guns

Together, these answers suggest that there is cause for optimism in peacebuilding initiatives because the militarization seems to have been limited to weaponization – *it does not seem to have permeated into the sociological fabric of society.*

75. The implications of this phenomenon are two-fold, and contradictory. First, the relative lack of paramilitary institutional structure (or at least a lack of institutional consistency) suggests that the sustainability of such forces is weak because it is dependent on immediate circumstances (availability of weapons, the mobilization of grievances, specific economic conditions), and the availability of mobilizers and “conflict entrepreneurs.” Second, although the sustainability of such militarised groups may be weak, the chances of these forces being mobilized again remain high unless the original precipitating circumstances are changed.

76. The most vulnerable populations of Solomon Islands are reported to have suffered the most during the Tensions; in particular, women and youth. In participatory exercises to map the patterns of peace and conflict in Solomons, the latter group was identified as both a victim and a perpetrator of violent conflict; as both a peace group and a conflict group. This suggests the need to peel away the layers of experience within the Tensions and to look more critically at the many sub-groups within the country who affected, and were affected by violent conflict. To underscore the obvious: if youths continue to feel marginalised from the peace process, and economic and political life more generally, or if they perceive the central government to be too slow in responding to their demands then the likelihood of a return to violence remains high.

¹⁴ Leonore Hamilton. Personal Correspondence. 11 March 2004

Armed Stakeholders

There is little evidence of substantial illegal small arms-transfers into the Solomon Islands since 2000. There appears to be a minor “ant-trade” between Bougainville and West Solomons, but price differentials strongly suggest that a small arm trafficking in the southern direction is not profitable. There are also unverified reports of supplies to the MEF in previous years, but little evidence to back the claim. To date, no quantity of mass-manufactured small arms has been traced to external (smuggled) sources – though ammunition must be smuggled in. Instead, serial number traces almost invariably lead to known Solomon Island stockpiles, either civilian or state-owned. The illegal trade is clearly an area requiring further investigation.

A range of direct and indirect impacts of small arms misuse persist some three years after the signing of the TPA. At least 50-60 people have been killed in 2003. Non-fatal firearm injuries remain uncounted, but epidemiological estimates suggest a ratio as high as three non-fatal shootings for each lethal gun injury, or as many as 150-180 wounded. Armed crime – particularly extortion, kidnapping and intimidation – was widely recorded, and appears to have subsided with the arrival of RAMSI. (UNDP 2003)

77. Who were the armed stakeholders during the Tensions?¹⁵

- *Civilians:* In 2000, there were approximately 800 licensed civilian gun owners in possession of an estimated 800 firearms. Although an April 2000 government order called in all civilian-held weapons for safe storage in official armouries, most were never handed in.¹⁶ It is estimated that some 84 “commercial” (e.g. mass manufactured) weapons were turned in between 2000 and 2003 – to the IPMT and others. Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza has publicly discussed their collection, though official plans had not been finalised, as of July 2003. The RSIP was investigating the existing number of registered owners.

- *Isatabu Freedom Movement/Guadalcanal Liberation Front:* The IFM emerged between March-October 1998 and was estimated to number between 500-2000 rural Guadalcanalese from the south coast, northwest and northeast of Honiara.¹⁷ They were a largely disorganised militia group. Though lacking central leadership, several commanders’ co-ordinated eastern and western factions in armed operations that successfully drove out Malaitan settlers from rural Guadalcanal. In 1999, the IFM was also known as Guadalcanal Liberation Front, Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA), and Isatabu Freedom Fighters (IFF). There were estimated to be between 400 and 500 “hard core” IFM militants in 2000 at the time of the TPA (though some 2,000 received amnesties). In 2003 there were an estimated 100-150 well-armed militia, primarily in the Weather Coast and under the leadership of Keke and Kaoni. The IFM militia are estimated to have approximately 1.6 weapons per combatant ... and estimated 160-240 weapons – of which 20 per cent are “high powered” or “commercial”.

- *Malaita Eagle Forces:* The MEF arose in response to the IFM in early 1999 and included an estimated 150-300 Malaitans recruited principally from former and serving RSIP officers (including para-military units) and disgruntled displaced Malaitans and settlers — indeed, the Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group reported that it could not distinguish between the MEF and the paramilitary Police Field Force. Members of the MEF were grouped into units (e.g. the “Tiger Unit”) according to their tribal affiliation in central and northern Malaita. These “units” determined to some extent their command loyalties. At their height, some up to 3,000 MEF combatants were believed to be active – of which 50-75 were militarily trained professionals – though some 1-2,000 was believed armed. The MEF were assumed to have 1.6 weapons per member – though the proportion of these weapons that are likely “high-powered” was also higher. Total estimated holdings of the MEF in 2003 were 800-1,600 of which some 240-480 is believed to be “high powered” or “commercial.”

- *Royal Solomon Island Police:* The RSIP had some 1,442 sworn police officers in 2000 – including paramilitary units – and some 730 firearms between them.¹⁸ It is difficult, however, to discern between those not “routinely” armed within the RSIP and the paramilitary units who were regularly armed. Within the RSIP are several small paramilitary units, including the Police Field Force (PFF), the Rapid Response Unit

¹⁵ The material in this sections is drawn directly from UNDP 2003. Aside from that document, no other written material was available. ¹⁶ According to an anonymous source (in UNPD 2003), of those weapons that were handed in, many have since gone missing. After the amnesty, the armouries were progressively depleted as Deputy Police Commissioner Wilfred Akao sent his officers to “re-arm” themselves with surrendered weapons. This happened a total of four times – and armouries were successively stripped. Communication with Akao, Deputy Commissioner, Operations, RSIP, January 22 2003. ¹⁷ Included mostly Guadalcanal-born rural agricultural laborers, including some 100-child soldiers, in loose community groups. Their primary source of employment had been the plantations before they were shut down as a result of violence. ¹⁸ This rises to 900 if Special Constable weapons are included. According to key informants with the RSIP, there were “officially” 784 weapons in police stocks in July 1999.

(RRU) and the Special Prison Task Force (SPTF) that acted as the de facto army and protected SIG interests such as timber extraction and mining concessions. It is assumed the PFF were regularly armed, consistent with other formal military actors in the Pacific region. The RRU was largely untrained and formed in 1997 of police units, the PFF and a number of officers of the SPTF.¹⁹ More than 100 PFF and RRU officers reportedly joined the MEF in 2000 to form what the MEF calls the “Joint Paramilitary Police-MEF Operation”. As of July 2003, the RSIP was approximately 1,045 strong, and includes some 326 Special Constables (see below), 224 with the PFF or “Star Division” and up to 130 RRU and the SPTF personnel.

- *Special Constables/Police Reserves:* In 1989, the number of Special Constables serving with the RSIP stood at approximately 50. At the signing of the TPA, the number was approximately 500. Under the provisions of the TPA, only 200 ex-combatants from the MEF and IFM were to be demobilised and to adopt the post of “Special Constable” or “Police Reserves”. In the absence of formal controls, they multiplied to more than 2,056 – primarily MEF ex-combatants – and constituted a tremendous drain on the budget.²⁰ In addition to those culled by the SIG between 2001 and 2002, the UNDP has registered some 1,178 Special Constables for formal demobilisation – of which more than 800 have been reintegrated.²¹ As of July 2003, only 326 Special Constables were registered with the police force and, though “not regularly armed” – with a total of 94 firearms.

“... One character that I met last week had been a Special Constable (SC) since 1967. His case demonstrated that the SC concept is a good community-policing ideal that was just bastardized during the conflict.
— A local UNDP consultant

Variations in Levels and Patterns of Violence

78. It was surprisingly difficult to collect specific information on the levels and patterns of violence in Solomon Islands. However when we piece the material collected during the field mission, we begin to see that there is not a single, unitary, conflict. Rather, there are a number of violent sub-conflicts over the 1998-2003 Tensions. These differ according to armed stakeholders, victims, tactics, objectives, intensity and geographical location. Table 1. illustrates this point.

79. There is no question that it would benefit from more systematic and extensive fieldwork. Indeed, we would

¹⁹ The RRU was to be disbanded following complaints about their lack of professionalism in September 1999, but the police reform plans never took place. ²⁰ Payments for the Special Constables ballooned to approximately USD 2.5 million in 2001. ²¹ The demobilized Special Constables (SC) are primarily from Honiara (586 SCs); Guadalcanal - East and West and Goldridge - (202 SCs) and Malaita (71 SCs). It is planned to demobilize a further 25 SCs in the other provinces before the end of the UNDP Special Constables Demobilisation project. Those SCs remaining in the police are maintained by the RSIP to fill up for regular police who are not attending work regularly

We would be surprised if there were not disagreements over our particular assessments of levels or dynamics of violence in these locations. This would be a welcome response, if it served to focus more critical (and empirically-based) attention on the variable patterns of violence in Solomon Islands – and more specifically their impact and implications for development programming.

be surprised if there were not disagreements over our particular assessments of levels or dynamics of violence in these locations. This would be a welcome response, if it served to focus more critical (and empirically-based) attention on the variable patterns of violence in Solomon Islands – and more specifically their impact and implications for development programming. The broader point of this table is that there are variations that must be considered in development and peacebuilding programming. Violence was/is not generic or homogenous.

Thumb Nail Case Study: Dynamics of Conflicts in and around Honiara

80. Even a cursory overview of Honiara in the lead up to the Tensions provides a glimpse into the complexity and interaction of multiple conflicts in Solomon Islands. In broad terms, conflict in and around Honiara followed an inter-group pattern of violence, predominantly between armed stakeholders within Malaitan and Guadalcanal communities. This case study of Honiara demonstrates how each of the core Peace and Conflict Development issues played a central role in creating the conditions, which allowed the Tensions.

- Historically, **economic opportunities** compelled the migration of labourers from Malaita to Honiara. Gradually, labourers began to send for, or bring, their extended

Box 13. Initial Scan for Potential Peace or Conflict Impact Issues

- Equity Issues**

Will some groups question the fairness of a project (location, distribution of benefits, etc.)?

- Exclusion Issues**

Will some groups feel excluded? E.g., non-Malaitans, non-Guadalcanal Youth, non-Special Constables?

- Inclusion Issues**

Who will be included in an initiative? Are mechanisms in place to ensure that any conflicts generated by inclusiveness are resolved effectively and non-violently?

- Corruption/ Legitimacy Issues**

Will an initiative contribute to corruption or support illegitimate groups or mechanisms. OR will it increase the capacity of legitimate groups, or will it contribute to transparency, responsiveness, and public responsibility?

families with them to Honiara and bordering areas in Guadalcanal.

- Access to government services** becomes an increasing volatile issue with the centralisation of government. As Malaitans in Honiara draw on public services and opportunities, Guadalcanal people from areas around Honiara begin to feel that they are not receiving their “fair share” of the economic rewards and royalties. Resentment simmers, and political entrepreneurs seize the opportunity to harness this resentment.

- Land management and mismanagement** contributes to conflict escalation in a number of ways. Issues of land ownership and use come to the fore when the government body responsible for allocation and management of Temporary Occupancy Licences (TOLs) – a mechanism by which non-alienated land may be occupied by someone from outside the area for a set period of time – facilitated an increasing number of Malaitans settle around Honiara. TOLs were inappropriately used due to the breakdown in government administration; some settlers with TOLs remained permanently on the land without renewing the license and other settlers made gardens in land outside the TOL boundary. At the same time, international companies in Guadalcanal who were responsible for establishing worker housing in rural areas (such as Solomon Island Plantation Limited/ SIPL and Gold Ridge) allowed the families of workers to establish gardens and houses adjacent to agreed housing areas and on traditionally owned lands. That many of the workers were Malaitan further politicised identity.


- **Incompatibility between different modes of disputes resolution**, decision-making around land, justice and economic issues inhibited the effective and non-violent management of normal conflicts. Additionally, the clash between traditional systems (for example: Malaitan and Guadalcanal) fuelled disputes around Honiara.
 - **Justice**: With a break down in law and order building up over a period on ten years there appeared to be no effective mechanism for intervening and resolving these disputes appropriately – either through the chief, churches, women’s groups, government administration and RSIP leading to the propensity towards violence.
-

ANALYSIS OF DONOR RESPONSES

81. Australia, New Zealand and regional neighbours had a range of diplomatic and military responses to the Tensions, culminating with the deployment of RAMSI. During and after a breakdown in law and order during the Tensions, a broad spectrum of actors took up the challenge to regain and to rebuild a sense normalcy within which to create the space for development activities and peace building to occur. This included government, church leaders, community-based organisations, private businesses and many other grass roots, district and provincial actors.

82. The donor community are important players, both during the tensions and in the new RAMSI-created environment. As noted in the introduction, the scale of donor inputs relative to the size of the economy of Solomon Islands is significant. Donors are funding a large portion of the 2004 development budget of US\$60 million, and Australia and New Zealand are further supporting the recurrent budget (ADB 2004).

83. Most donors have agreed to assist the Solomon Islands Government in implementation of the National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan (NERRDP) for 2003-2006. This policy document defines government strategies, policies and actions to be under taken for economic recovery, social restoration, reform and development. While the plan is awaiting full implementation, it nonetheless sets out



strategic framework for rebuilding basic economic infrastructure and social capital as well as rebuilding the foundations for sustainable economic growth and human resources development in Solomon Islands. The NERRDP does not set out to be a peacebuilding strategy, however it strongly seeks to address the impacts of the Tensions.

84. The NERRDP identifies and focuses on five Key Strategic Areas. These are:

- Normalising law and order and security situation.
- Strengthening democracy, human rights and good governance.
- Restoring fiscal and financial stability and reforming the public sector.

- Revitalising the productive Sector and rebuilding supporting infrastructure.
- Restoring basic social services and fostering social development.

85. The NERRDP strongly emphasises, in part due to donor and Government prioritization, weapons collection, and enforcement of law and order in order to remedy the conflict situation. The report also notes in some instances the inter-relationship between conflict issues and impacts, and strategic areas of support although it is limited in informing how this work should be shaped to enhance peacebuilding impacts and mitigate conflict-generating trends (See Diagram 2). For example, it importantly notes that "... the fundamental policy, institutional and structural obstacles to economic and social inequity are dealt with immediately and seriously". As illustrated in the introductory sections to this report, there is a catch to a focus on these strategic areas: each of them can have either a peace or a conflict impact. There is a danger that peace and conflict "blind" implementation of this plan will exacerbate tensions and lead back to violence.

86. Because the NERRDP defines policy and strategy at the highest level, the ability of NERRDP to have a peace and conflict impact depends on the detail of the NERRDP Implementation Plans. To ensure that NERRDP has a positive, peacebuilding impact each of the NERRDP implementation plans would need to have a peace and conflict analysis integrated within the plan. Prior to completion, each plan should be reviewed with a peace and conflict lens.

87. During the tension, with the breakdown in government functioning and increased lawlessness and corruption, donors increasingly withdrew direct support to the Solomon Islands Government and supported communities directly in meeting their basic humanitarian needs. The European Union withheld STABEX funds to the value of \$42 million Euro and administered a small fund that directly provided assistance to communities for improved infrastructure. The Australian Government, while continuing to engage with the Solomon Islands Government, particularly focused on strengthening law and order, extended their programme of assistance to directly target communities through the Community Peace and Restoration Fund and direct support to the National Peace Council. The UNDP approach was to focus on a Province (Isabel) and work around the dysfunctional central government to directly assist communities, while using its neutrality to pursue work on several key conflict factors in an attempt to precipitate a transition.

88. At the request of Solomon Islands Government, Australia and New Zealand's foreign policy shifted to focus on Government-to-Government relations. Accordingly, Australia's aid programme now, in addition to the existing projects, supports in-line government positions, which have allowed Government Finances to stabilize, and the law and order situation to normalize. The improved environment has triggered a release in further funding to programs, which work in partnership with Government. New Zealand's aid programme has announced a comprehensive package of assistance to revitalize the Government's education system. Other donors have announced plans to re-engage with the Solomon Islands Government, including the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, Japan and the European Union.

89. Donors are now developing new programming for the post-RAMSI environment and the summary of Donor Responses in Annex 2 represents a snapshot in the early stages of the planning cycle. Using the PCDA lens, the current work of donors appears to be focused on:

- Strengthening government and access to government services. For example New Zealand's support to the Department of Education and Australia's support to prisons, police and the judicial system, and the health sector.
- Creating economic opportunities. For example the European Union's STABEX funds have been allocated primarily to transportation and rural income generation through farming.
- Law and Order. RAMSI's work in direct support of government (Military and in-line positions) in partnership with Australia's existing Law and Justice Programme and the European Union's assistance to Police.

90. Using the PCDA lens again, some gaps in donor responses to the core PCDA issues become apparent:

- Facilitating the work of Solomon Islanders to explore and generate solutions to the clash between traditional and non-traditional systems across sectors, particularly in land and justice. Such a space might be created through supporting an independent 'think tank' with commissioned research papers.
- Serious consideration of fundamental development and investment policy, institutional and structural changes to respond to patterns of inequity in distribution of resources, through a peace and conflict lens.
- Working beyond "reconciliation" and other specific peacebuilding "activity" level approaches to address and reduce the complex underlying causes of conflict.

91. It is important here, to also remember that different work does not need to be done to have a peacebuilding impact, but that the work that is done currently should be done differently. The guidelines and principles (Section C) have been designed to assist donors and project managers to evaluate the way they are doing their work, through a peace and conflict lens.

92. This discussion about donor responses has focused on movements of the majority of donors. However, the third-largest donor to Solomon Islands, the Republic of China, has followed a different pattern of engagement. The Republic of China continued, throughout the Tension, to work in close partnership with Solomon Islands Government on basic service delivery (education and health) and the rural constituency development fund. In the post-RAMSI environment, the Republic of China continues to work in close partnership with Government.

GUIDELINES AND PRINCIPLES

93. It is a truism that “conflict in Solomon Islands is complex.” But, if policy, planning, and programming are to be effective, and if the space for nurturing sustainable peace is to be created, then the questions that need to be answered are: how to make sense of this complexity, and more importantly how to accommodate it in our work – whether work is within government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, or societal groups more broadly?

94. At this point, it is useful to recall that the focus of PCDA is not limited to self-described peacebuilding initiatives or narrowly defined “peacebuilding actors.” While these types of initiatives and actors are certainly included, it is equally important to include the broad spectrum of actors whose work affects (or is designed to improve) levels of development directly or indirectly. In the current context, “work” includes the policy and planning functions of governments (and the delivery of government services) as well as private sector investments — no less than the well-known work of donors, NGOs and Community-based groups.²²

➤ **Seek a common understanding of the so-called “causes of conflict” from which to launch a coherent joined-up peace building strategy**

95. There is not a single peace, but many conceptions of peace in Solomon Islands. Those working in the security sector, for example, tend to operationalize peace as a form of law, order, and stability – the absence of which was the very reason why the Solomon Island Government called for assistance from regional neighbours. The Church sector views and works for a peace reflecting Christian traditions with a particular emphasis on social justice. The peace sought by traditional leaders and chiefs is different, again. It is a concept of peace rooted in a traditional sense of reconciliation. The business sector views peace as the stability and predictability that sustains investor confidence and allows them to get on with the work of business. Government actors, tend to see peace through the lens of governance, which they seek to operationalize through political structures that resolve inter-provincial grievances and equitably represent the aspirations and interests of the many different groups that collectively constitute Solomon Islands.

96. → *Policy and Programming Implication:* The achievement of true and lasting peace in Solomon Islands ultimately requires the consolidation of all of these conceptions of peace together. While the order and stability won back by the efforts of Solomon Islanders and RAMSI may have been essential for re-establishing a sense of normalcy, sustainable peace requires the systematic support and consolidation of the efforts of other policy instruments. Neglect of other dimensions or conceptions of

²² As explained in the introduction, such an inclusive focus is unavoidable because of our understanding of peace building as an impact. That is, it is not what you do that matters (whether you build a health clinic in rural Guadalcanal, draft social policies targeting youth, or invest in Western Province), but its peace building or conflict-generating impact that is the concern of PCDA.

peace increases the likelihood of failure. Different understandings of peace within the donor community can also lead to very different, potentially incoherent or ill-coordinated, responses.

➤ **Development policy and programming need to be sensitive to multiple, intersecting conflicts**

97. There is not a single conflict in the Solomon Islands, but many different conflicts – over land, public resources, political autonomy, migration and settlement patterns, traditional and non-traditional systems of authority, and so on. These conflicts play out separately, in different locations of Solomon Islands. Sometimes these conflicts overlap, or turn violent, and sometimes they do not.

98. No fewer than three significant intra-group tensions were noted during the 1998-2003 period: (1) within Guadalcanal between pro-and anti-GLF supporters, with a major divide between the Weather Coast and the rest of Guadalcanal; (2) within Malaita between the North and the South; and (3) the military confrontation between Southern and Central Bougainville Revolutionary Army in Western Province. Intra-group conflict may aggravate inter-group violence in Solomon Islands in a number of ways. It may (1) inhibit inter-group accommodation, for example when armed stakeholders within groups refuse to participate in inter-group peace processes; and (2) escalate violence, for example, when armed sub-groups launched attacks across inter-group borders in order to win support within their own communities (as with Hamas suicide bombers).

99. The multiplicity of conflicts over time has led to a far more complex and variable pattern of inter-group and intra-group relations in Guadalcanal, Malaita and beyond. A one-dimensional understanding of conflict subsidizes one-dimensional programming that will lead inevitably to poor developmental impact as well as possible aggravation of violence. Reducing the conflicts (sic) in Solomon Islands to an inter-Provincial (Guadalcanal – Malaita) axis of conflict risks increasing tensions elsewhere – possibly leading to violence.

100. → *Policy and Programming Implication*: Programming in violence-prone settings will inevitably affect the dynamics of peace or conflict. This should influence the choice of partners as well as the type and location of programme or project. A policy, programme, or project may be “conflict-sensitive,” but if it considers only one type, level, or “axis” of conflict it risks being negatively affected by coexisting conflicts, or worse inadvertently aggravating other conflicts. For example, initiatives perceived to be focussed narrowly on conflict-affected areas in Guadalcanal and Malaita may generate conflict in other areas (both within those provinces and in other provinces) if groups believe they are not benefiting — or worse, if they believe that others are benefiting at their expense; or if some are seen to be “rewarded” for violent behaviour, thereby sending the message that the way to obtain government or donor assistance is through violent confrontation. This is related in part to the development industry’s tendency to focus on perpetrators of violence rather than victims, and on victims rather than on other poor. But to the extent that the poor and the victims become the front line recruits for



Although the intra-Malaitan antipathies pre-date the Tensions, they were exacerbated by the MEF/IFM conflict. Long-standing divisions between north and south Malaita created shifts in alliances and tactical manoeuvring that even included reports of Malaitans in the south approaching the IFM for explosives they seized from the Gold Ridge Mine during the conflict. Further tensions within the Malaita/MEF ranks are closely associated with claims for compensation. Elements within the MEF vented their anger on 24 October 2000, following the failure of their leaders to compensate those who fought in the conflict from monies awarded by the central government – the headquarters of one of the MEF leaders, Andrew Nori, was set on fire indicating the level of frustration.


conflict entrepreneurs, their neglect in policies and programming helps to ensure a steady supply of “angry young men”.

➤ **Conflict in Solomon Islands cannot, and should not, be labelled an “ethnic conflict” or an “ethnic crisis”**

101. A review of reports on political developments in Solomon Islands illustrates an overwhelming – and quite mistaken – tendency to describe (or worse, to explain) the “conflict” (sic) in Solomon Islands as an “ethnic conflict.”²³ This view is discounted and discredited by most people working within Solomon Islands – including individuals working within organizations whose documents continue to mischaracterize the conflict as “ethnic.” This view is dismissed for good reasons. First, ethnographically speaking, the term ethnic conflict just doesn’t make sense for Solomon Islands. As one interviewee points out:

Solomon Islands highlight a number of problems for the concept of ethnicity as an analytical measure. The first problem is that ethnic identity can be constructed in a number of ways, creating the possibility of an individual possessing numerous ethnic identities. Melanesians can be classed as one group as distinct from Asians and Polynesians. Furthermore, individuals of ‘one-talk’ can be considered an ethnic group because they identify with this label when in an environment of people who speak different languages. A third grouping is the kin or tribe level. These three levels of possible ethnic distinction become more complicated when people are of mixed blood further enabling them to identify with other *wantok* and tribe groupings. One individual could meet the criteria for ethnic inclusion into a considerable number of groups. The implication of this to our discussion is that when analysing ‘ethnic’ conflict it must be made clear how ethnic identity is measured. This is extremely important because, as our case highlights different measures will yield different results. Another approach is to determine how the belligerent ‘ethnic’ groups constructed their identity. The problem with this approach is that ethnicity can be used as a tool for elites seeking to pursue material and or immaterial objectives.²⁴

102. Second, as noted above, there were many conflictual factors contributing to the outbreak of violence in 1998. Ethnicity or identity is often seen as a crucial factor but “ethnicity” itself neither “causes,” nor adequately describes the conflicts in Solomon Islands. Rather economic, environmental, and political tensions and competition have served as the basis for manipulation and mobilization of identities by, what a Solomon business man called “conflict entrepreneurs” who sought to enrich themselves through the conflicts.



Economic, environmental, and political tensions and competition have served as the basis for manipulation and mobilization of identities by, what a Solomon businessman called “conflict entrepreneurs” who sought to enrich themselves through the conflicts.

103. → *Policy and Programming Implication:* There is no question that there were conflict mobilizers during the Tensions who actively politicised – and militarised – grievances and identities. Policies and programmes, which uncritically accept these politicised group boundaries, risk reinforcing and legitimising them. This is a significant risk when it involves the introduction and allocation resources, goods or services. If allocation is seen to be based on politicised identities then it risks reinforcing divisions and tensions. The issue of compensation of self-defined aggrieved parties is particularly salient in the current context. Without a clear understanding of the complexity of identity, cannot be thought about, let alone formulate development policies and programmes that manage conflict and nurture peace.²⁵ More importantly, as long as

²³ For example: the Government of Australian Country Brief 2003; UNDP 2001; EC 2002. ²⁴ Kieren McGovern (2003). M.A. Thesis, International Relations and Asian Politics, University of Queensland ²⁵ In the language of an unrecovered academic: “This type of representation of identities and ethnic relations is essentialist and inaccurate because it neglects other competing, indeed antithetical, histories which document inter-marriage and social exchange across those identity boundaries that now constitute the battle lines [violent conflict].” Bush and Keyman 1997.

“ethnic conflict” apart from ethnicity, is not set mistakes will be repeated, reproducing a future that looks disappointingly like the Tensions of the past.

➤ **Provide the legal and administrative framework to support traditional management systems**

104. A narrow focus on land may obscure the underpinning sources of conflict. A complicated and sophisticated land tenure system that has evolved over time is currently in place in Solomon Islands. It is currently under stress. In response to making customary land more amenable to modern perceptions of land management, centralized efforts to institutionalize customary land ownership have been attempted. These efforts have not succeeded, though several pilot studies are ongoing with regard to recording and registering of customary land.

105. While land ownership and management is diverse, there has been little or no adequate consultation with resource owners on the shape and form of acceptable systems. Other shortcomings include, a lack of local acceptance and confidence in the process, strong bias towards recording and registration running counter to local perceptions of land management [and fear of that ‘registration’ equates to takeover], and little focus on how to facilitate the use and management of customary land at the local level.

106. → *Policy and Programming Implication:* More consultation needs to take place to better understand local perceptions, and existing traditional structures, which can be built upon. Strengthening existing customary approaches may be more appropriate and effective in improving land tenure security than other approaches. Development policies and programme relating to land tenure or dependent on systems, should carefully assess how traditional management and ownership structures can be incorporated so as to build confidence and participation by resource owners thereby strengthening traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Finally, though the need for donor assistance to address these issues is greatest in provinces heavily impacted by recent tensions the nature of the issue is such that a model may be more easily developed where issues are not overly entangled.



...there is a risk that expat *wantokism* will fuel perceptions that the high foreign presence (undefined) in Solomon Islands is another form of occupation or a return to colonial rule.

➤ **Avoid (the perception of) outside intervention and interests that may be harnessed to reduce the impact of peace building and development**

107. There is a strong feeling within all communities in the Solomon Islands that the traditional Melanesian *Wantok* system has a pervasive influence on most social, political, and economic relationships. However, there is less awareness of what one person called “Expat *Wantokism*” – whether this is illustrated in: the use of “local hire positions” to recruit expats living in Solomon Islands; the expat composition of monitoring or assessment missions to the country; reported expat salaries; or in the high percentages of donor assistance that find their way back to donor countries²⁶.

108. → *Policy and Programming Implication:* Within the context of the current RAMSI mission, as well as other major donor interventions, there is a risk that *expat*

²⁶ For example, a reported 60-70 per cent in the case of Australia

wantokism can fuel perceptions that the high foreign presence in Solomon Islands is another form of occupation or a return to colonial rule. Further, as the “big men” involved in criminal—militant activities are arrested and taken to task for crimes, the risk will increase that the “bigger men” (who might feel that it is only a matter of time before they join their colleagues in Rove Prison) will actively mobilize dissent around this issue. At the moment, this would likely be a hugely unpopular move throughout the country, as the tangible benefits of the law and order delivered by RAMSI are acutely appreciated, not least because of the rawness of the memories of violence during the Tensions.


➤ **Build forward-looking strategies based on friendship, empathy, and relationship-building**

109. The essence of peacebuilding is trust and time. In Solomon Islands this means understanding what it means to work “the Melanesian Way.” Nothing will work unless it is built upon a foundation of trusting relationships – within communities, between and within Provinces, and between the Provinces and Honiara. A critical element in the trust-building process is physical presence. Bungee jumping in and out of a project site undercuts the ability to build deep-rooted trust (for example, expatriate contracts of three to six month duration). Foreign volunteers, for example, have still not fully returned to the Provinces following their evacuation during the Tensions – an evacuation which some have argued was both unnecessary and counter-productive because: levels of violent conflict were far lower, or non-existent, in many places in the Provinces compared to Honiara. The net impact of pulling them out was to extend the sense of crisis geographically throughout Solomon Islands, while removing crucial monitoring and trust-building links within the communities – two essential roles in a country so overwhelmingly focused on Honiara.

110. → *Policy and Programming Implication:* Long-term commitment is as important as physical presence. All areas of Solomon Islands have seen development actors come and go; projects start and close. The bitter sense of the capriciousness of donor commitments (diplomatic, military, developmental, and humanitarian) was expressed quite strongly by some participants especially in consultations in Malaita. The adoption of a long-term, relationship-based, perspective may be difficult for donors. Funding and project cycles often require them to force organic, long-term, participatory, responsive ideals into the narrow mechanistic, short-term, imposed, blue-print structures of the development industry.

➤ **Recognize the “corrupting” and sub-optimal influence that the introduction of development funding (and unregulated private investment) can have within a cash poor economy**

111. This may mean cultivating personal and working relationships with local level actors who have been marginalized from peacebuilding efforts, except rhetorically, e.g. respected chiefs. This may be accomplished by working either directly with chiefs and chief councils or through existing community structures such as the Church.



Recognize that effectiveness is sometimes more important than efficiency when we place a priority on peacebuilding. Using policing as an example: this is the difference between using the number of arrests (efficiency measure) versus the changes in the level of trust towards police within community (effectiveness measure).

Local level actors are sometimes inefficient groups to work with because they lack the usual skills and resources required for connecting “outside efforts” with “inside efforts” (for example, literacy, language, management skills, “logical framework thinking”). Because of this, more effort than normal is required to work with them, inevitably entailing costs in terms of finances, time, training, and so on. However, to the extent that these individuals or groups possess legitimacy and authority within their communities they constitute a group, which may well, be less than efficient in terms of implementation but effective in terms of access and peacebuilding potential.

112. → *Policy and Programming Implication:* Don’t just throw a bag of money and run. Donors are much more favourable to large grants over small grants because it is more administratively efficient. However, it raises dangers of overwhelming organizations that lack capacity to manage it, with the attendant risks of: project implosion, lack of impact, loss of credibility, and lost future opportunities. In addition, without full understanding and planning to avoid or manage conflict potentials, injections of finance and development may once again become part of the problem, reinforcing conflict axes, structures causes of conflict, and/or at least feeding into and becoming muddled by widespread perceptions of relative deprivation during heightened tensions.

➤ **Capacity building, ownership and participation as the core principles for all programming**

113. Without these core principles (cum objectives), any beneficial impact will be short-lived. One without the others will lead to frustration and failure. But together, they create the space for genuine empowerment of Solomon Islanders to assume control of decision-making and problem solving that is the foundation for a sustainable, equitable and just peace. In other words, to ensure an initiative has a positive peacebuilding and developmental impact, it needs to be able to answer “yes” to the following two questions:

- Is the initiative increasing the capacity of Solomon Islanders to identify problems, and to formulate and implement their own solutions non-violently and effectively? This would include:
 1. The ability to think about and identify peacebuilding (and development) challenges and opportunities;
 2. The ability of organizations to restructure themselves to respond to peace building (and development) challenges and opportunities; and
 3. To change how they normally work so that they can respond more effectively and efficiently in ways that have a hard, positive, peacebuilding (and development) impact on the ground - for example, in ways that improve fairness, equity (including gender equity), “even-handedness,” accountability, and transparency.
- Is the initiative built on a partnership that leads towards genuine ownership by Solomon Islanders? This may refer to individual and collective sense of ownership of political processes and structures, an unambiguous sense of ownership of land, (particularly ownership of the process to resolve land disputes), or community ownership of an infrastructural project.


114. The ability to answer “yes” to these questions requires further analysis through a peace and conflict lens. For example, it is often suggested that the potential for violent conflict within communities would be lower if traditional leadership structures were strengthened. The programmatic implication of this suggestion might be to work with, and through, the traditional chief structures in the design, implementation, and monitoring of a development initiative – as this would seem to respond to question #2. However, political and programmatic complications set in when we acknowledge that there are often competing structures of traditional chiefly authority (e.g., competition between hereditary chiefs, self-appointed chiefs, community-selected chiefs, meritocratically-appointed chiefs, and descendents of the “Headmen” appointed during the colonial period). Further, even within small communities, there are layers of leadership and authority in addition to the chiefly authority structures: an incomplete list might include: Church leaders, elected leaders, criminal leaders, aspiring leaders, business leaders, and moral leaders.²⁷ Finally, even when functioning smoothly existing systems may reinforce social inequities and tensions.

115. What we soon see that there is no silver bullet; no one blanket solution to address all problems; and that the simple answer “yes” to the deceptively simple question above requires an examination of a thick and complex set of issues that are guaranteed to slow initiatives down, increase ambiguity about the process and outcomes of an initiative, and raise awkward political questions of control. If these are indeed the costs of undertaking PCDA, the costs of not undertaking it are even higher.²⁸

116. It would be misleading not to note that quite a number of individuals consulted for this report (from all sectors) were actively wrestling with the two-fold challenge of SI ownership and capacity building (including the Ministry of Finance, Department of Lands, the Public Solicitors Office, and the Community Peace and Restoration Fund). It is recommended below that these experiences should be collected and analysed so that all actors from all sectors might learn about what has worked (or not) in different circumstances so as to contribute to their own efforts.


117. The discussion of capacity building in Solomon Islands would be incomplete if it did not also consider the difference between missed opportunities to build capacity on the one hand, and activities that actively incapacitate individuals and organizations. An example of the first phenomenon was suggested by someone working within RAMSI who observed that arrests tend to be undertaken by RAMSI forces rather than the RSIP, and as a result, the local police force is not developing its arrest capacities — even if the RSIP officers are “not keen on participating because of concerns over possible fall out with their *Wantok* or from where ever.” The second issue, of course, is the risk that RAMSI creates the impression of (or is portrayed as) an occupying force (a term which arose on a number of occasions in consultations).

118. The second dimension of incapacity is quite different. It is about the incapacitating impact of a structure or initiative. The often cited example is the way in which “European” (“Western” or “non-Traditional”) legal structures may actively



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If these are indeed the costs of undertaking PCDA, the costs of not undertaking it are even higher.




The Need to “Own Conflict” as much as to “Own Peace”

The development of a personal understanding of “owning conflict” is as important as the development of capacity of communities to “own peace.” Peace building entails both (1) the construction of the structures of peace and (2) the deconstruction of the structures of violence. Thus, the development of an understanding of how communities and government “own conflict” (that is, sustain conflict through attitudes, actions, non-actions, and so on) is an essential ingredient to peace and unity.

²⁷ Obviously, these are not mutually exclusive categories.

²⁸ The need for approaches to reconstruction, which place a priority on capacity building, is a welcome feature of the MOU between SIG and ADB (6-18 March 2004). However, the emphasis on “private sector-led economic growth” should raise questions about ownership. Ownership by whom? Private ownership for private gain, or public ownership or regulation for public benefit?



...the best contributions of foreign advisors to the delivery of government services, if they are narrowly, or primarily, product focussed, (administration of justice, land surveying/ map making, the establishment of accountable financial systems) may serve short-term needs while undercutting sustainability...

undercut and incapacitate the ability of chiefs to resolve conflicts at local levels, because they make available non-traditional avenues to “over-turn” the chiefs. (See discussion on Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Authority Structures). The result is not “only” the undercutting of a particular decision by a particular chief in a particular conflict. The larger result is the de-legitimizing of an authority structure that had played a crucial conflict mediation/ resolution function in the past. This will likely require an explicit consideration of trade-offs between efficiency and effectiveness.

119. → *Policy and Programming Implication:* If a priority is to be placed on Solomon Islands ownership and capacity building — across the full scope of developmental activities including: education, public service reform, economic accountability, law and justice and so on – then a balance needs to be struck between the immediate needs of service delivery (a product focus), and the longer term needs of the capacity of Solomon Islanders to address their issues (a process focus). This also implies that even the best contributions of foreign advisors to the delivery of government services, if they are narrowly, or primarily, product focussed, (administration of justice, land surveying/ map making, the establishment of accountable financial systems) may serve short-term needs while undercutting sustainability to manage these services in the medium and long term.

120. In terms of peace building, broad acceptable throughout society of the legitimacy of the state and the credibility of governance should be a central goal as it helps to build civic spirit and national unity. Fostering popular participation in the governance agenda is also essential for peace building. It empowers individuals, communities and organizations to negotiate with institutions, influence public policy, and to provide a check on the power of the SI government. It follows that a constructive interaction between civil society and government is a critical component of long-term peace building.

PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS


121. A great many ideas, recommendations and proposals were developed over the course of the exercise and consultations with stakeholders. Key recommendations to Government, donors and civil society actors emanating from the Report are outlined below, though in some cases no specific details are provided on how to implement them, or who should implement them. At this preliminary stage, this is a conscious decision, as the specifics and consensus will need to be developed through further discussion.

1. TRADITIONALIZE NON-TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURES

122. There is no question that this was one of the strongest themes in consultations, touching most conspicuously on issues of land, justice, and economic development. There is a need for a much clearer context-specific understanding of traditional authority structures and how they have been affected by non-traditional systems and competing systems of authority.

123. At the moment, the tendency of donors and government is to try to fit (harness) traditional systems for their own specific institutional ends. Here is the challenge posed as a question: how would the structure and processes of donor and government activities change if they were modified to fit traditional structures? Answer: Quite fundamentally, we suspect. As discussed in some detail in the initial discussion of core peace and conflict development issues, this is a particularly difficult issue to address, not least because traditional structures are not static or unchanging over time. There are competing “traditional structures,” as well as questions about the role of the Churches in local level governance.

124. And, there are problems of the “manipulation” and “distortion” of traditional practices, most evident in the monetization and exorbitant inflation of “compensation.” Understanding how the traditional and non-traditional structures fit together, or don’t fit together, or undercut each other, is not easy or straightforward. However the questions they push us to answer are the ones that most Solomon Islanders are convinced are the right ones. How should this be done? One starting point, is to bring those with thick anthropological understanding of different communities within Solomon Islands into a concrete, action-oriented, policy dialogue with government and donor communities to begin to work together systematically towards the development of approaches that are genuinely rooted in Solomon soil.²⁹



Here is the challenge posed as a question: how would the structure and processes of donor and government activities change if they were modified to fit traditional structures, rather than current, reversed, arrangement? Answer: Quite fundamentally, we suspect.

²⁹ This work has started in the Justice sector with SILJSISP 2003, and the governance sector with NA/ Woods 2003.

2. SUPPORT POLITICAL REFORMS (E.G. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OR DECENTRALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT) THAT CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEBUILDING AS WELL AS SERVICE DELIVERY

125. A comprehensive review of the sociological implications of decentralization has already been undertaken (N.A/ Tom Woods 2003). The Woods study provides a foundation on how to undertake this discussion of a “State” (i.e., Federal) system of government - consultative process of assessing whether – or how – to move towards political-structural reform. At the moment there is a need to assess the hard institutional and political considerations of moving or not moving this idea forward; the way this is done (i.e., the mechanics of implementation) is as important as what gets done (the end output or specific decentralized structure).¹

126. Such an assessment should recognize that (1) not all provinces are likely to benefit economically and politically to the same degree from decentralized political structures. And (2) there is wide variation in the capacities and resources (broadly understood) of the nine Provincial Governments to formulate and implement decentralized structures. From a PCDA perspective, these proposals would need to be analyzed for potential peacebuilding and conflict-generating potential.

3. IDENTIFY AND PROMOTE A PRACTICAL BASIS FOR THE USE OF LAND THAT PROVIDES SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY FOR ITS OWNERS AND SO REMOVES A SOURCE OF CONFLICT AND OPENS OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

127. Support the development of new approaches that emphasise the traditional community base for resource management while protecting resources needed for subsistence and which include a practical formula for resource-sharing that can bring sustained benefits to all stakeholders – including the return of alienated land to the original customary owners so that it remains available for development through lease-back arrangements.

128. Following directly from this recommendation, there is a need to follow up on the SILJSISP Report which examined the feasibility and desirability of establishing a Tribunal as a forum for dealing with customary land matters within the Solomon Islands using a model incorporating Melanesian concepts of consensus as opposed to the current Western adversarial system, and incorporating principles of good governance, body composed of representative national and international actors and organizations.


4. PROMOTE ECONOMIC REFORM THAT WILL ENHANCE PEACEBUILDING AND REMOVE THE CAUSES AND FACTORS THAT LED TO VIOLENCE CONFLICT³¹

129. A RAMSI Economic Reform Scoping Mission that visited Honiara in February 2004 identified a number of major constraints on the sustainable growth of private sector

³⁰ There is particular concern within some Malaitan groups that a decentralization of political power might be used by Provincial Governments to limit the movement of Malaitan workers throughout the country. One political representative within the Malaitan communities expressed vague support for decentralization while also expressing concerns about what he called “Big Bang Federalism” – which he used to refer to a process of reactive implementation.

income-earning opportunities. It suggested key strategies for overcoming these constraints. They include regulatory reforms, development of transport infrastructure and utilities, SOE reform, financial sector reforms, provision of policy and governance advice to provincial governments, development of statistics to inform policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation, and formulation of sectoral policies to promote investment and growth. In order to assist in the formulation and implementation of economic reforms, an Economic Reform Unit is proposed to be established, possibly within the Ministry of Finance.

130. In NERRDP's strategic area of revitalizing the productive sector and rebuilding supporting infrastructure, it is acknowledged that the enabling private sector environment must be enhanced by improving both physical and institutional infrastructure, including the legal and regulatory framework. Business laws and regulations, and the supporting legal institutions are often ineffective, because they tend to be outdated, flawed in terms of design, not fitting to the country's setting and business environment, or often simply not applied properly. As a result, related transaction costs for businesses are high, thereby exacerbating the impediments caused by the country's historically unfriendly business environment, and adding to the high cost environment for the private sector.



...improving both physical and institutional infrastructure, including the legal and regulatory framework, must enhance the enabling private sector environment

131. The investment regime is weak and represents a disincentive for foreign direct investment in light of the more attractive options available in many other countries. Investment approval processes for foreign investment are complex, time-consuming, discretionary, and involve high transaction costs. The Investment Act of 1990 requires amendment to reflect a shift from an approval-based to a registration-based system. The tax and duty regime also needs to be restructured to be more transparent and conducive to both local and foreign investment. Unfavourable business-related work permit and migration procedures create additional impediments.

132. Banking institutions provide few services, seldom reach beyond urban areas, and have high collateral requirements. In particular, the inadequate framework for collateralizing debt denies access to credit for many, largely because of land tenure issues and the apparent lack of a functioning secured-transactions framework. While it is possible currently to use some forms of collateral, the process is costly, inefficient and risky to lenders. A sound legal framework for secured transactions would permit farmers, consumers, and businesses to use movable property as collateral for loans.

133. The above policy, strategy, and reform efforts need to be mindful of the core peace and conflict issues raised in this report. As outlined earlier, positive, negative and neutral impacts on peace building will occur throughout the economic reform process. In particular equity, access, multiple economic zones, social impact reviews of investment policies, and labour and resource owner relations should be key considerations.

³¹ This sections draws directly from ADB (2004).

5. STRENGTHEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND CREATE A CLIMATE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INTERACTION BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT

134. Government and donors should encourage vigorous community consultation and participation in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policy, programmes and services. Governance reforms should increase the legitimacy of the state and the credibility of the institutions of governance in the eyes of civil society, a key prerequisite to ensuring national unity and instilling a sense of civic duty. Further, the participation of civil society in all elements of governance is in itself a conflict prevention initiative in that it acts as a check on the power of government, and creates a sense of ownership when the influence is wielded on public policy issues.

6. EXAMINE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS FOR SOLOMON ISLANDS

135. There have been suggestions that a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” would be a useful mechanism for “healing and sustainable peace” in the Solomon Islands. This may, or may not, be true. Before a decision can be made on such a proposal, there needs to be much more clarity on just what such a Transitional Justice Mechanism might look like in the Solomons. This would require a rigorous consideration of what worked and didn’t work in these other cases, and what might be appropriate for Solomon Islands (no doubt in a substantially modified form). Most importantly, what processes currently exist in Solomon Islands – and the Melanesian culture more generally — that would constitute the basis for such a mechanism? And finally, any proposed mechanism must be assessed through a peace and conflict lens. To what extent might it be conflict generating, rather than peacebuilding? To what extent would it undercut the authority of the chief(s), or the courts? How can these concerns be incorporated into its establishment, if this idea is indeed adopted?

7. STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND EXISTING ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS TO CLOSE LOOP HOLES WHERE “CONFLICT ENTREPRENEURS” OPERATE

136. The current study fully supports the recommendations by *Transparency International* that more resources should be allocated to the anti-corruption institutions in Solomon Islands – specifically, the Ombudsman’s Office, the Leadership Code Commission and the Auditor General’s Office. Such findings must also reflect the long-term needs of Solomon Islands to take a holistic approach to the justice sector, which underpins many parts of an effective anti-corruption approach. Additionally, it supports the ADB (2004) suggestion that an Economic Reform Unit be established.³²

8. ESTABLISH STANDARDS AND VERIFIABLE CODES OF CONDUCT FOR EXPATRIATE OFFICIALS AND ADVISORS WORKING WITHIN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS GOVERNMENT

137. There is a large number of non-Solomon Islanders working within government ministries and agencies. Based on discussions with many of them, there is quite a range of understandings of what their roles and responsibilities are. Some were outstanding in terms of their sensitivities towards the challenges of their role in facilitating SI capacity building and ownership – for example, within the Public Solicitor’s Office, the Ministry of Finance, and the Solomon Islands Law and Justice Sector Institutional Strengthening Programme. This underpins the call for the development of Standards and Verifiable Codes of Conduct for Expatriate Officials and Advisors working in government agencies and offices to be monitored by an independent mechanism.

9. EDUCATE AND BUILT THE CAPACITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES ON ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN A POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

138. A variety of public authorities (in central government agencies, departments and the various tiers of National and Provincial Governments) are entrusted with powers and responsibilities that have direct and indirect impacts on peace or conflict. The powers that these public authorities exercise in allocating resources, conferring benefits and other actions affect the rights of every citizen. As weak institutions are more susceptible to becoming embroiled in conflict situations, rapid and sustained capacities should be built at the leadership and institutional levels of key ministries, especially with regard to their sectoral roles in a peace building strategy

139. Even when policymakers have revised laws with progressive intentions, and enacted new policies and plans, without local level awareness on how they should be implemented, communities rarely benefit from these initiatives. A thorough, practical, understanding by public authorities of peace building as well as fundamental rights and obligations is an important first step in ensuring access to available services and effective support mechanisms that these citizens can turn to in ways that may build peace and avoid or minimize overt violent conflict.

10. ENSURE MORE EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION TO COUNTER PERCEPTIONS FEEDING INTO CONFLICT CYCLES

Box 14. Mentoring for Peace

Mentoring requires trust. Trust requires honesty. Honesty requires empathy. Empathy requires communication. Communication requires presence. These four characteristics serve as the four pillars of mentoring. Their presence does not guarantee success, but their absence does guarantee failure of a mentoring programme.

140. Communication Projects may contribute to addressing problems of countrywide communication, which remains a key source of grievance, associated with people being marginalised from decision-making processes or political life in Honiara. Among other things, this might focus on expanding people-to-people linkages, as well as the

³² “The Government informed the [ADB] Mission of the possibility that an Economic Reform Unit may be established, possibly at the Department of Finance and Treasury, to oversee, coordinate, and implement private sector regulatory reforms; infrastructure service provision policy and regulation; state owned enterprise reform and privatization; financial sector reforms; provincial economic development; statistical collection service reforms; and specific sectoral policy reforms to promote new investments in potential growth areas. ADB welcomes the proposed establishment of such a Unit and, once established, will actively support its operations in cooperation with other donors, especially in the areas of infrastructure policy and regulation, legal and regulatory business environment, and SOE [State-Owned Enterprises] reforms. (ADB 2004)

reach of the media and an increase in professional standards of conduct, journalistic ethics, objective and balanced reporting, critical skills and investigative journalism (factors that were reported to be lacking in national reporting during the Tensions).

141. A focus on the media services would involve a dual strategy: to improve poor and inadequate media infrastructures and to disseminate information on how peace processes and reconciliation are working. Another option is to focus on developing provincial media and to include them within national news. This would greatly enhance national awareness and provincial relevance.

142. Communication projects might also include the promotion of the use of media such as community radio as a tool for (1) enhancing community mobilization, collaborative actions, develop effective communications among the people, for peace promotion and community development; (2) supporting gender sensitive community-based peace education; and (3) building capacities of communities to formulate, implement, and manage peace activities in their immediate environments.

11. REVIEW YOUTH POLICIES IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES AND PERCEPTIONS IN CREATING CONFLICT – ADDRESS WHY THE DECISION IS MADE TO PURSUE VIOLENCE

143. Given that Solomon Islands has one of the highest natural growth rates in the world, and given that large numbers of youth appear to have been explicitly involved in the militarised violence that characterises the tensions, there is a clear need to understand and to respond to the needs, concerns and aspirations of this large and growing segment of the population. To this end, all government policies and donor interventions should be reviewed with a view to strengthening the way such interventions address the social, economic, political, psychological, physical, and spiritual needs of youth.

144. Failure to do so, risks contributing to the perpetuation of the cycles of poverty, rights abuses, and armed conflict by a generation that has lost its innocence and a sense of what it means to be an integral and important part of a peaceful society. A number of different methodologies might be used to ensure effective youth programming: (1) use of “situation-based” analysis, which considers a range of factors so that programmes are sensitive to local history, politics, culture and social and economic realities; (2) programming from a rights perspective to help ensure that human rights are considered as the framework for designing interventions and determining acceptable outcomes; (3) involving youth as active participants in the design, implementation and evaluation of interventions on their behalf; (4) recognizing cultural patterns, local traditions and customs as potential assets to programming; (5) programming across sectors (that is, not ghettoising child and youth issues).

12. DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF PCDA TOOLS


12.1 Institutionalise PCDA at the strategic level

145. There is a general appreciation of the potential utility of Peace and Conflict related Development Analysis or social impact analysis in the work of development actors in Solomon Islands, including SIG, NGOs, and donors. Exactly how this might be undertaken and integrated into their work is less clear. The establishment of a PCDA capacity or “mechanism” would serve as a resource for all stakeholders interested in using, and ultimately integrating, PCDA within their policies, plans and projects. This facility could take the form of an individual backed up with the necessary resources (financial, administrative, logistical, and institutional).

146. More broadly, there is a need to establish an information-clearing house for missions, reports, and documentation on political, economic and social developments in Solomon Islands. When a Bishop was asked how many teams of travelling consultants had beaten a path to his door in the past four months, he had to count on both hands. Yet, there was great difficulty in acquiring relevant background material before and during the PCDA mission. One important and unique dimension of the dissemination of material should be translation into Pijin and local languages; it might also include presenting material in an intelligible and culturally appropriate manner.

12.2 Carry out a systematic examination and assessment of the basic structures, dynamics, patterns, and impacts of conflicts during the Tensions

147. Compared to other countries that have experienced periods of militarised violence and social upheaval, there is a surprising lack of information about the structures, dynamics and patterns of violent conflict during the Tensions. At the most basic level, this boils down to the questions: Who did what to whom? Where did this happen? When did this happen? Why did it happen? (Or what are the competing reasons for it happening?) What are the impacts of these actions? And what are the implications for fashioning an effective response? In this connection, there is no systematic assessment of the local-level impacts of the Tensions in Solomon Islands – in both Guadalcanal and Malaita, but throughout the country more broadly. Without such data and analysis, there is no solid empirical basis for “responsive” programming or investment strategies whether by government, NGOs, or the private sector to address the so-called “causes of conflict”.



So, for example, the call for some kind of “trauma counselling” may or may not be needed or valid – but unless we know what the impacts have been (on different communities in different locations over time) and what mechanisms current exist to deal with post-conflict issues (traditional, Church-based, and so on), such proposals lack an empirical foundation.

12.3 Apply PCDA at project level to conflict related activities

148. Parallel with, or even prior to, the launching the PCDA Facility noted above, it is recommended that a number of pilot projects be identified and supported in the core

areas outlined in this report. This might, for example, include a commitment by UNDP to explicitly integrate PCDA into selected projects (for example, its UNDP-SIG Isabel Province Development Project - Strengthening Local Governance for Effective Service Delivery).

... there is no systematic assessment of the local-level impacts of the Tensions in Solomon Islands – in both Guadalcanal and Malaita, but throughout the country more broadly. Without such data and analysis, there is no solid empirical basis for any “responsive” programming or investment whether by government, non-governmental actors, donors, or the private sector.

149. At the moment, our understanding of the ways in which our policy, programming, investments, and development work have either conflict generating or peace-building impacts is pretty much reduced to anecdotal evidence. While there is an endless supply of stories and insights, this has not been collected systematically either among actors or within organizations. The current report is only an introduction and overview of what appear to be the essential issues from the perspective of selected stakeholders in Solomon Islands. Consistent with the discussion above, the capacity for intensive PCDA need not, and should not, be imported from outside. It should be cultivated actively within Solomon Islands.³³

... our understanding of the ways in which our policy, programming, investments, and development work have either conflict generating or peace-building impacts is pretty much reduced to anecdotal evidence.

150. However, as anyone who has been involved in gender training knows, it is a long way from developing the skills of individuals, and the integration of issues, attitudes, and priorities within an organization (whether this is a government department, NGO, or donor organization). The most effective way to do this depends on the environment – and organizations (e.g. level of existing capacities, type of work, networks of access, role of government and societal actors, types, patterns, or legacies of violence, and so on).

³³ See Bush (2003). *Hands-On PCIA: A Handbook for Conducting Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments*. Available electronically at: <http://www.lgsp.org.ph/pdf/COP-PCIA.pdf>

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Annex 1 Guidance Note on PCDA

WHERE TO LOOK FOR POTENTIAL PEACE OR CONFLICT IMPACT ? ¹			
AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT	EXPLANATION	EXAMPLES	
		 PEACE IMPACT	 CONFLICT IMPACT
1 Conflict Management Capacities	Capacity of state or civil society: (1) to manage and resolve conflict without the use of violence, or without the use of authority structures that support illegitimate violence; and (2) to promote genuine and sustainable peace Impact on capacity to identify and respond to peacebuilding opportunities and conflict –creating challenges. This might include formal mechanisms (dispute resolution boards; strengthening legal mechanisms) or more informal mechanisms (low-key meetings, community leader interventions, creating channels for local level dialogue).	(1) Initiatives in conflict prone areas that hire, train, and keep local personnel— especially in administrative, technical, and management positions – are strengthening governance capacities, which may be used in state & societal institutions that deal with conflicts non-violently. Unfortunately, this is the technical and managerial capacity that flees when non-violent conflict turns (or re-turns) violent. (2) Efforts by many organizations (international, governmental, and non-governmental) to include conflict resolution and peacebuilding workshops (and increasingly, PCIA) into their daily work is a substantive contribution to the development of capacities for peace. (3) Initiatives that maintain effective "outreach," "public dialogue," or participatory activities help to keep stakeholders involved and build inter-group trust and understanding.	One of Kosovo's most experienced human rights activists who had been trained in Norway and Geneva had helped to establish a women's legal aid center in the 1990s. However, during the UN-driven reconstruction exercise she was reduced to a "local employee" of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to translate for international staff with a fraction of her experience. Officially, she was unable even to take testimony from victims. This reservoir of local talent should have been the centerpiece of the UN reconstruction strategy. However, the overall impact was a contribution to the <u>incapacity</u> – rather than capacity – of civil society to rebuild itself upon a foundation of tolerance and respect. (Guest 2000)
	SAMPLE INDICATORS*		
	3 # of conflicts in which gov'tal/ non-gov'tal bodies are involved as mediators, facilitators, negotiators, etc. 3 Perception of local mediators and aggrieved parties that conflict can be resolved without use of violence 3 Number conflict resolution workshops – and follow-up	3 Respect for process and outcomes of dispute settlement through public institutions 3 Belief in possibility of receiving fair treatment/ outcomes through public institutions	3 Perception that violence is not a legitimate or effective means of resolving conflict 3 Degree to which peace and conflict issues are considered in the formulation and operation of initiatives ("Do No Harm," PCIA, Conflict-Sensitive Programming, etc)
2 Militarized Violence and Human Security¹	Direct and indirect impact on (1) patterns and levels of violence by militarised forces; and (2) an individual's and community's sense of security or insecurity – including physical and mental well-being and sense of individual or group identity. "Militarised forces" include rebels, paramilitaries, warlords, militias, bandits, organized crime rings, vigilante groups – when they use military weapons and structures. "Community" includes both resident populations and returning populations "Patterns of Violence": Different groups in society experience different levels (and types) of violence and therefore have different levels of insecurity, e.g., women, children, minority groups, marginalized groups, and returnees.	(1) The inclusion of ex-combatants in peace and reconstruction work in both Nicaragua and parts of Mindanao were clear efforts to "deconstruct the structures of militarized violence" and to "construct the structures of peace." (2) In many cases, the negotiations for humanitarian ceasefires (e.g., for National Immunization Days) have opened up communication channels that have later contributed directly to longer cease fires and even peace talks—as in Sri Lanka. (Bush 2000). In Somalia, the demand from the local population that their children be immunized led local leaders to de-mine roads to permit access for vaccination teams. Orders were issued to combatants that no weapons were to be displayed on the days of the immunization campaigns. Such initiatives have dampened militarized violence and increased human security.	Working with, or through, groups which use illegitimate violence and abuse human rights – for example for the protection of convoys, compounds, and offices, or as middlemen for the provision of goods and services—is an obvious example of how an initiative can strengthen rule by force and violence (threatened and actual).
	SAMPLE INDICATORS*		
	3 Conflict-related deaths or injuries 3 Disappearances 3 Incidence of human rights abuses, including rape, sexual torture and violations of children's rights – and effectiveness of official responses to reports of such violations 3 Levels of domestic violence 3 Number of riots or other uncontrolled expressions of dissent 3 Demonstrations	3 Number of displaced people 3 Rate and patterns of repatriation/ displacement 3 Arrests or detention without probable cause or warrant 3 Incommunicado detention 3 Cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment in detention 3 Inhumane conditions of detainment 3 Dependence on private security forces	3 Perceptions of individual and collective security 3 Levels of criminality (effectiveness of state responses) 3 # of small arms in circulation (e.g., black market price of an assault rifle) 3 Number of children, women and men involved in military activities 3 Level of food security
3 Political Structures and Processes¹	Impact on formal and informal political structures and processes – this could apply from the local municipal level through to the national level. It also refers to both the strengthening the governance capacities of different levels of government, and the capacities of civil society actors to actively and constructively participate in the political process. This might be evident in: the strengthening of the capacities of legitimate leaders (or reinforcing the rule of anti-democratic forces); increased (or decreased) transparency, accountability, and participation in decisions affecting the public; the strengthening or weakening of the rule of law and representative government.	(1) In the late 1990s, the Group for Environmental Monitoring in South Africa undertook a far-reaching participatory, applied research project on the linkages between "militarization and ecology." The positive peace impact was clear in (1) the word-for-word inclusion of its research and recommendations in government defense policy; and (2) the mobilization of non-English speaking peasants for the project enabled these groups to continue to express their concerns long after the project was finished, and to contribute to on-going dialogue with government on policies affecting their lives and livelihoods. (2) Sustained efforts by local groups in the southern Philippines to create Zones of Peace are inspirational examples of how the mobilization of ideas and people can begin to restructure the political and military structures to create peace from the ground up – even in the midst of on-going violence.	The decision to accept the cheapest bid to rebuild a water tank in a rebel-controlled area of Country X in 2002 produced a host conflict-creating impacts. Because the project was undertaken by a rebel-controlled front company, workers were forced to work for free, tractor owners were forced to donate the use of their equipment; and funds that should have gone to pay for labour, equipment and material, seem to have become a significant financial contribution to the rebels. The project reinforced the anti-democratic rule of the rebel group, and had a further negative development impact when the water tank was washed out during the rainy season. The imposition of "solutions" by outside actors to the benefit of the imposing power, and the impoverishment of the recipient communities. For example: the imposition of inappropriate "reforms" or "solutions" by a central govt in marginal or conflict-affected areas; the bankrupting of a country by conditions imposed by International Financial Institutions in countries (such as Argentina); or imperialistic invasions such as the war by G.W. Bush in Iraq.
	SAMPLE INDICATORS*		
	3 Freedom of speech/ media 3 Presence of multi-communal political parties/ business groups/ civil society orgs 3 Free and fair elections (levels of participation in elections)	3 Levels of emergency rule in parts or all of the country 3 Freedom of movement, public participation in, or influence on, the policy making process	3 Perceptions and evidence of corruption 3 Popular perceptions that the political, legal, and security systems are fair, effective, and responsive – or not

4	Economic Structures and Processes¹	<p>Impact on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Strengthening or weakening equitable socio-economic structures and processes; > Distortion/conversion of war economies; > Economic infrastructure; > Availability of scarce basic goods; > Availability of investment capital to create economic and employment alternatives to war-fighting; > The stability of the banking system; > Increasing or decreasing the economic dependence on military (or military-related) employment; > Productivity and the equitable distribution of non-war/peace benefits; training; income generation; > Production of commercial products or services; > Food in/security; > The exploitation, generation, or distribution of resources, esp. non-renewable resources and the material basis of economic sustenance or food security. 	<p>(1) In Ethiopia, in the mid-1990s, water projects improved access of displaced pastoralists to water, and thus reduced a major source of conflict with local populations.</p> <p>(2) In Somalia in the early 1990s, shopkeepers and merchants were actually supporting violence and looting because their regular supplies of agricultural goods for their markets had been destroyed by the drought and clan conflict. In an attempt to resolve this problem, a development worker named Fred Cuny talked a number of a number of development agencies to implement programmes which involved selling food aid to these merchants on a regular basis at stable prices in order to reduce their dependence on looted supplies, and to return merchants to their traditional role as self-interested defenders of law and order seeking the stability necessary for normal commercial activity. The projects encouraged merchants to apply pressure on the militias to limit their disruption, and to cut off a source of funding to the militias who used the merchants' payments to purchase more weapons. (Source: Natsios 1997)</p>	<p>Uneven distribution of public resources (jobs, water, pensions, etc.); payment of "taxes" to warrior organizations; discriminatory hiring practices; weakening private market forces by working through war economies.</p> <p>In the mid-1990s, many international actors sought to strengthen the economic security of Russia as a means of reducing instability in a country of war-prone regions. One particular area of activity was the re-writing of Russia's bankruptcy laws. By forcing companies that had been ignoring their creditors to finally pay their debts, the new legislation led to big increase in bankruptcies -- which rose to 11,000 in 1999 from 4,300 in 1997. With weak, money-losing companies out of the market, analysts hoped that the Russian economy would become more competitive and "robust." Instead, powerful politicians and "businessmen" (some with murky links to organized crime) often had their cronies named as court-appointed managers of troubled companies, allowing them to take over some of the firms and strip them of any prize assets, thereby contributing to economic insecurity, rather than security. (Maclean's, 20 May 2002, p. 65)</p>
		SAMPLE INDICATORS*		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 Dependence on war economies (e.g., use of black market; reliance on (para) military employment) 3 # of jobs created in non-military related sectors 3 Ratio of military expenditure to social expenditures by state 3 Pre- versus post-conflict export (and investment) levels 3 Level of economic control by local or national actors for local or national interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 National unemployment rate versus rate among vulnerable populations (ex-combatants, returnee and displaced populations, war-disabled, widows, youth, war-affected regions) 3 Dependence on external assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 Availability of basic goods to all communities 3 Personal savings rates 3 Regional and national inflation rates 3 Strength of foreign currency 3 # and size of new businesses
5	Social Empowerment¹	<p>Impact on: creation of a culture of peace – characterized by constructive social communication, tolerance, inclusiveness, justice, participation, and respect. Confidence and capacity of all members of society (from the "weakest" to the "strongest") to effectively overcome obstacles to a satisfying life.</p>	<p>A project in Haiti to reconstruct the police force specifically recruited from communities, which had suffered rights abuses, because it was felt that they were most sensitive to the need to protect and promote such rights.</p> <p>Mentoring relationships between urban planning professional across inter-group boundaries in Bosnia Herzegovina supported the development not only technical capacities, but inter-group communication and understanding as well.</p>	<p>It is increasingly common to "consult" with communities before launching an initiative (sometimes this is the first and only time of contact). To the extent that these meetings accept and work through the existing social power structure, then they may reinforce social inequities and tensions. For example, authority structures which dis-empower women, or certain social or economic groups.</p>
		SAMPLE INDICATORS*		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 Sense of local ownership over peace processes 3 Levels of tolerance/ distrust within cultural, social, ethnic, political, religious organizations 3 Level and type of social interactions between groups 3 Levels of inter-marriage 3 Levels of bilingualism (where language is a political issue) 3 Level of participation by "marginalized" or "dis-empowered" groups (women, the poor, the disenfranchised) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 # of cross-cutting cultural or social organizations; 3 Inclusive/ exclusive schooling system 3 Adult and children's perceptions of other groups/ levels of Stereotyping; Role of the media/ levels of censorship 3 Levels of trust between groups 3 Rejection of a gun culture/ militarized culture (glorification military violence) 3 # of locally-initiated and run peacebuilding initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 Level of dependence on outside support in conflict resolution and peacebuilding 3 Number of families dislocated by conflict 3 Number of families with at least one member who is "missing" 3 Levels of "trauma" within communities and degree to which it interferes with normal activities. Effectiveness of responses to this trauma. 3 Suicide rates (Who? Where? Why?)

(These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities)

¹ Source: Kenneth Bush (2004). Building Capacity for Peace and Unity: The Role of Local Government in Peacebuilding (Ottawa, Canada: Federation of Canadian Municipalities)

Annex 2 Donor Responses Matrix

ACTOR	THEME					
	LAW AND JUSTICE	LAND (Alienated and Customary)	ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES	TRADITIONAL/ NON-TRAD'L SYSTEMS	ACCESS TO GOVT AND GOVT SERVICES	COMMENTS
DONORS With 2004 estimated development grant figures ²	Overall significant increase in donor funding over the past twelve months (and with the establishment of RAMSI) targeting key sectors identified within SIG NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY, REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN for 2003 - 2006					
Australia SI\$255,226,492	- Support for Police/prisons/ justice with advisers and in-line personnel. - Support to RAMSI law and justice intervention - Demobilisation of Special constables	- Land Administration Institutional Strengthening/ Capacity Building Programme	- Economic governance: - Budget stabilisation through strengthening the Ministry of Finance. - Economic Reform - Rebuilding the machinery of Government - Accountability mechanisms - Provincial Grants facility - Customs support - Forestry Management Project,	- National Peace Council - Humanitarian support to IDP's - Community Peace and Restoration Fund - New Community Strategy with support for CBO's - Peaceful Civil Society Fund - Kastom Garden	- Health Sector Institutional strengthening project, includes trust fund that stocks national medical store. - Tertiary education - Strengthening national disaster management	Pre-RAMSI focus on working with SIG and direct support to communities. Post RAMSI focus on working with SIG on economic recovery and reform and law and order
EU SI\$ 93,238,800	- Support to RSIP at Management level.	- Land and marine tenure research - Reducing vulnerability (EU/ SOPAC project)	- Sustainable rural development improved economic/ employment opportunities through Micro-projects - Transport/ infrastructure support in collaboration with ADB - Transport Trust Fund - Agriculture Rehabilitation and Develop Project - Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry, and Tourism - Rural finance and banking - Marine infrastructure	- Support to non-state actors/ CBO's through micro-projects funding	- Improved access to government social services - Education investment and reform in MOE, assistance to secondary education and rural training centres - Assistance to Curriculum. Development centre - Development of tertiary education – SICHE Scholarships - Capacity Strengthening of Dept of National Reform and Planning - Capacity Strengthening For decentralisation and Constitutional reform	Focus Sustainable Rural development and community development as outlined in Country Strategy Paper Post RAMSI agreement to release Euro 42 million in STABEX funds. This will focus on transport and communications infrastructure.
Republic of China (Taiwan) SI\$37,189,038			- Transport/ roading/ port handling equipment - Micro-projects - Rice Farming/ marketing - Tourism	- Micro projects with CBO's - Rural Constituency Development Fund - Compensation for lost property as a result of the tension	- Upgrading Central Hospital and strengthening primary health care. - Basic school supplies - Guadalcanal and Central Province Office reconstruction	Issues surrounding accountability of funds disbursement, especially around the constituency development funds.
Japan SI\$ 20,066,600			- Organic farming - Wharf repairs - Rural Communication Improvements Project	- Grass roots projects – support to CBO's	- Honiara International Airport upgrade - Support to SIWA for Rural / Urban water supply/ micro water projects/ - Power Station - New classrooms in rural areas/ school rehabilitation - Assistance to Rural Training Centres (RTCs) - Support SICHE nursing school - Provincial Hospital Upgrade in Buala and Makira - Support to immunization programme	POST RAMSI Japan has opened a JICA office and significantly increased bilateral assistance.

UN (WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCHR, GEF) SIG\$16,699,833		- National capacity on land degradation and drought (GEF) - SOPAC Regional Programs in plant genetic resources, biodiversity, international waters, national capacity (GEF)			- Emergency Support to Health Sector (WHO) - Training for Health workers and malaria control (WHO) - Reproductive health and family planning (UNFPA) - Isabel Provincial Government Office assistance (UNDP) - Integrated management of Childhood illnesses (UNICEF)	Programme has not changed significantly Post RAMSI. Focus on Isabel province as a pilot development planning project that may have applications throughout Solomon Islands. UN Programs are likely to change as the changed donor strategies begin to fund the UN to implement projects on behalf of bilateral aid donors.
New Zealand SIS\$10,739,500	- Support to Rove prison (in partnership with Australia) - Support to RAMSI law and justice intervention - Focus on Police Strengthening Project		- Assist in fiscal and financial stability, reform of public sector, and infrastructure - Assist with Constitutional Reform Process - Small business enterprise centre - Training for demob special constables - Honey Bee farming in rural areas	- Direct support to CBO/ NGO's - Civil society/ Leadership development/ capacity building - Support to the National Peace Council (NPC) in partnership with Australia.	- Education – focus on developing an education plan, universal primary education and focused tertiary training. - Capacity Building in various government sectors	Focus on Primary Education, and MOE HRD and capacity building, Support to RAMSI Law and order and governance projects.
United Kingdom SIS\$869,760				- Small Grants Scheme	- Emergency budgetary support to Primary Education - Tertiary scholarships	DFID programmes being phased out with UK objectives being met through EU and small FCO grants.
ADB (SIS TBC)			- Infrastructure rehabilitation (schools, roads, bridges, water supply systems, clinics, prisons)			Re-engagement Post RAMSI with Australia funding SIG defaulted loans
World Bank (SIS TBC) (SIG\$9,300,000 loan)					- Health Education Population Planning	Re-engagement Post RAMSI with Australia funding SIG defaulted loans
Kuwait (Loan)			- Honiara main road			
FIFA					- Sports infrastructure	

As illustrated in the introductory sections to this report, there is “a catch” to a focus on these strategic areas: each of them can have either a peace or a conflict impact. Therefore programming must explicitly contain a PCDA component in order to ensure – as far as possible – that they have a peacebuilding impact while avoiding a conflict generating impact.

Annex 3 Background and PCDA Methodology

1. Prior to the upsurge in violence from 1998 to 2003, Solomon Islands had been making modest gains in health, education and infrastructure. However, during “The Tensions” and the consequent loss of hundreds of lives and displacement of an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people (just under 10% of the total population), these gains were swept away. The virtual collapse of the Solomon Islands economy following the closure of most of its major industries by early 2000 prompted some analysts to label the country the Pacific regions first and only “failed state.”

Box 1: RAMSI

In July 2002 the National Parliament of Solomon Islands adopted legislation that authorized outside assistance to restore law and order and to support economic recovery. Following an invitation by the Government, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) led by Australia, was assembled and deployed under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum’s Biketawa Declaration and within the terms of the United Nations Charter. This initial deployment of a 2300 strong force represents the largest policing (with military support) operation in the region since World War II.

The mandate of RAMSI: to reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions and authorities in Solomon Islands, and ensure respect for the Constitution and implementation of the laws. Strictly speaking it is not “an intervention” in terms of international law – the Solomon Islands Government remains the sovereign authority. A “Special Coordinator” heads RAMSI. His role is to pull together the various strands of the operation (police, defence, civilian) and to engage with Solomon Islands Government. The strategy incorporates a comprehensive approach: law and order (which includes several aspects: weapons; general crime; abuses of power; corruption); government legal structures (prison, judiciary, and legal officers), and government finances (budget, revenue and broader economic reform).

2004 priorities will include consolidation of work with Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, military drawdown, and a significant expansion in development assistance. The priority development areas outlined by RAMSI are economic reform, machinery of government and accountability and law and justice mechanisms.

2. Yet, by the Autumn of 2004, the peoples of Solomon Islands found themselves in a very different situation from what they had been experiencing only 12 months earlier when the islands were gripped by lawlessness, personal insecurity and violent conflict. The arrival of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003 quickly restored public order and security, in addition to stabilizing government finances. Within this new environment, the donor funds, which had been suspended during the Tensions,³ began to flow in again. For the Fiscal year 2004, this amounted to donor pledges in the range of US\$ 100 million. In an effort to build and consolidate a solid foundation for lasting peace, the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) has initiated new policies, strategies and plans – most conspicuously in its National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan 2003-2006 (NERRDP) which will assist in identifying priorities, and provide for socio-economic recovery in a post crisis period in Solomon Islands.

PCDA Approach and Tools

3. The consolidation of lasting peace, however, requires an in-depth and shared understanding of, and approach to, peace and conflict issues. In particular:
- Government recovery policies, strategies, and plans (backed up by international donor assistance), will need to be peace and conflict sensitive, avoiding harm, and where possible making positive contributions to long-term peacebuilding and genuine reconciliation.

³ The social instability and economic and financial mismanagement by successive Solomon Islands Governments between 1998 and 2001 led to a 70% reduction in international assistance to Solomon Islands over that period, from US\$75 million in 1998 to US\$28 million in 2001. In addition to Australian assistance, New Zealand, the EU, Japan, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the UK provide varying levels of assistance to Solomon Islands across a range of sectors (Government of Australia 2003).

- Donors need to fully integrate peace and conflict issues into their poverty alleviation objectives and all phases of the programming cycle.
- Explicit linkages need to be made between policy and planning priorities, the immediate reconstruction needs of a “Transition Phase” and their peacebuilding or conflict-generating potential in the medium and long term – along with a

Box 2: A School Project Seen through a PCDA Lens

Imagine a school built in an area recently affected by violent conflict between local communities. Despite all the obstacles, the school manages to attract the teaching staff and educational materials necessary to get up and running. Two scenarios may be sketched out to illustrate the application of a Peace and Conflict Development Analysis.

Scenario One: A development “success” and a peacebuilding failure.

After three years, the school sees an increase in the number of students passing province-wide exams, and is seen accordingly as having had a positive developmental impact using pass rate as an indicator of success. However, when we apply a conflict lens to our analysis, we may see that the one community perceives the children of the other community to be benefiting disproportionately from the school. Tensions increase between parents of different communities, leading to the eventual burning down of the school one night by a drunken mob.

Scenario Two: A developmental failure and a peacebuilding success

Keeping our focus on the same imaginary school project, imagine that after three years, there is a measurable reduction in the number of students passing. It is thus seen as a development failure. However, through a peace lens we might begin to see how the school strengthened social capital and created a neutral space for kids to interact, and under the guidance of committed teachers, there was a reduction in negative stereotypes, an increase in the number of friendships between students (despite the discomfort this causes among parents from opposing communities). And perhaps it was these friendships that distracted the children from their schoolwork! Unless there is sensitivity to the peacebuilding and social reconstruction achievements of this hypothetical project, then it would be cast as a failure. Until we develop and apply the appropriate means to recognize and analyze such impacts, our ability to understand (let alone reinforce) positive linkages between development initiatives and peacebuilding will be hampered.

mechanism for systematically identifying, monitoring, and evaluating such linkages.

4. One process for undertaking a broad contextual analysis and developing a forward looking, action-oriented, strategy is a Peace and Conflict Development Analysis (PCDA).⁴ PCDA is a tool for Government, development agencies, NGOs, and community organizations in their efforts to increase both the developmental and peacebuilding impacts of their policies, programmes and

projects in conflict situations. PCDA, or similar tools, have been used in other countries with varying levels of success such as Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda and Guatemala.

5. For the PCDA to be most effective, it must be integrated into the government institutional and national strategic planning as well as the development planning cycle (identification, design, implementation, monitoring, review and assessment). The exercise must therefore be iterative, participatory and ultimately appropriated by stakeholders through an open-ended and genuinely participatory consultative process. The value of the PCDA is in its being responsive and interpretive; contributing to bridge-building in the broadest sense.

What is Peace and Conflict-Related Development Analysis?

6. The peace and conflict analysis of development initiatives differs from monitoring and assessment in the conventional sense because its scope extends far beyond stated outputs, outcomes, goals and objectives. Rather, it examines actual or potential impact of an initiative on the peace and conflict environment - an area it may not have been designed explicitly to affect.

7. Over the last few years, peacebuilding discussions have typically focussed on such activities as human rights projects, security sector reform, democratic institution strengthening, public sector reform, and more nebulously, “good governance” projects.

⁴ PCDA is a sub-set of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) developed by Kenneth Bush. See Bush 1996, 1998, 2003. See especially Bush 2001 for a critical discussion of some of the shortcomings in the ways the idea has been “operationalized.”

While these activities may have had positive impacts on the peace and conflict environment, there are also cases where they have had negative impacts. As importantly, it is essential that we also consider (even emphasize) the peacebuilding and peace-destroying impacts of those development activities that are not conventionally framed or analyzed in this context — for example, activities and initiatives in agriculture, irrigation, health, education, infrastructure development, and so on. Not only are such initiatives or instruments far more prevalent than “peacebuilding” projects, but also they are less likely to be viewed as having an overtly peace building or conflict-creating potential.

8. If we understand peacebuilding as an impact, then it is necessary to delineate the “peacebuilding impact” of an initiative, from its developmental impact, economic impact, environmental impact, gender impact and so on. When we do this, we see that positive developmental impacts are, at times, coincident with positive peacebuilding impact, but disturbingly, sometimes they are not.

9. When done properly, PCDA: -

- Identifies and assesses the ways in which the peace and conflict environment may affect a specific initiative or set of initiatives
- Identifies and assesses the ways in which an initiative (or set of initiatives) may affect either the peace and conflict environment
- Can help to establish a strategy by which to anticipate, integrate, monitor, respond to, and evaluate the peacebuilding opportunities and the conflict-generating obstacles that exist in every violence-prone environment.

Table 1 PCDA Usage in the Project Cycle

PHASE OF INITIATIVE OR PROJECT	How may PCDA be used?	Objectives
PRE-INITIATIVE	Planning Tool for Project Design, and Formulation	Anticipating/ “guesstimating” future impacts; “Building in” conflict prevention/ peacebuilding mechanisms
IN- INITIATIVE	Performance Monitoring and Management tool	Monitoring Immediate Impacts
POST- INITIATIVE	Strategic Planning for future phases	Evaluation, Institutional Learning

SOURCE: Bush 2003

10. PCDA is a process similar to Gender Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment, which helps identify and understand the impact of initiatives on the structures and processes of peace or conflict – whether this is undertaken by a government actor, Civil Society Group, NGO, or a private business. PCDA can be used in a broad range of conflict-prone settings in Solomon Islands, i.e. places beyond the focus on Guadalcanal and Malaita; places where there is a risk that non-violent conflict may turn violent, or return to violence (for example Western Province).

... PCDA underscores the need to peel away the multiple layers of violence in order to build a sense of their interconnections, dynamics, histories, contexts, and trajectories.

How Development can Create Conflict?

- By increasing socio-economic inequalities – or fuelling the belief that such inequalities are increasing
- By benefiting certain groups more than others
- By increasing competition for development resources & political control
- By introducing new structures & institutions that challenge existing ones (social, political or economic)

For the PCDA to be most effective, it must be integrated into the strategic planning of government, NGOs and donors, as well as into the full project cycle (identification, design, implementation, monitoring, review and assessment).

11. Annex 1 contains a set of tables drawn from *HANDS-ON PCIA: a handbook for conducting Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments*. These are intended to provide a glimpse into how exactly a PCDA might be undertaken. They identify and

Box 3: Trade offs between Peace and Development — Equality versus Equity; Efficiency versus Effectiveness

A housing project in Sri Lanka provides an excellent example of how we might have to do our work differently – rather than to do different work – if we are to consciously reinforce peacebuilding incentives through our development programming. Importantly, the example also points to some of the developmental trade-offs that may be required in order to increase the likelihood of constructive peacebuilding trade-offs.

The example is one where the arithmetic of the development programming appears clear and straightforward. It was a project, which sought to provide 3000 houses in a community consisting of equal percentage of Tamil, Sinhalese, and Muslim populations. The decision by the community was to allocate the houses equally between each group, i.e., 1000 houses to each identity group. While there were the normal complaints about this decision, the community as a whole accepted it and the houses were introduced.

On the one hand, this illustrates how the communities made an explicitly political decision about the allocation of development resources based on the ethnic geography. However, here is the rub: each community had not been affected equally by the violence. Some communities in fact had greater need for housing. Thus, this example illustrates how our standard developmental criteria (needs-based decisions; efficiency-driven decisions; product-oriented rather than process oriented approaches) may have to be subordinated to peacebuilding objectives. In this case, the principle of equity (needs-based allocation) was subordinated by the politically expedient of equality (arithmetic allocation).

It gets more complicated yet: We have to ask ourselves, even if the decision was made by the communities themselves (as it was), did this development project reinforce politicized ethnic boundaries? In some ways it did. Was there an alternative? Perhaps the full example of success in this project would be when the communities itself made its own decision based on the straight criteria of need. The task, which still confronts us, is how to get there from here.

explain areas in which a development initiative may have peacebuilding or conflict-generating impacts, as well as provide examples and sample indicators.⁵

12. This report recognizes that conflict is not necessarily a “bad thing”. As illustrated in later sections, PCDA helps us to understand the interconnections between different kinds of conflicts.

An Overview of “The Tensions” In Solomon Islands (1998-2003)

13. The former British Protectorate of Solomon Islands, a tropical Southwest Pacific archipelago northeast of Australia, has a population of 409,000⁶ and ranks amongst the poorest and least developed nations in United Nations statistics.⁷ Predominantly Melanesian, more than three quarters of Solomon Islanders are subsistence or cash cropping farmers, and reside in small villages within culturally different island communities. These communities are grouped into nine provinces, including the main island of Guadalcanal (location of the national capital, Honiara) and Malaita - the most populous island. More than half the population lives in Guadalcanal and neighbouring Malaita islands. Following the Second World War, thousands of Malaitans migrated to Guadalcanal in order to find work. Malaitan-dominated Honiara enjoyed special political status as the new national capital, separate from Guadalcanal Provincial Government with an elected provincial assembly

poorest and least developed nations in United Nations statistics.⁷

Box 4: Social and Political Movements in Solomon Islands

The Fallows Movement

The Fallows Movement, spearheaded by former missionary Richard Fallows in the late 1930s, claimed that the British

Administration had neglected the needs of rural people in terms of political autonomy including better schools and health services and better working conditions. The movement pushed for the establishment of a ‘Native Parliament’ to discuss problems and prepare demands for submission to the British administration (Laracy 1983:13-14). To contain this movement, the British administration deported Fallows ending the movement. However one outcome was the establishment of native courts and sub-district councils, which were viewed as a major historical move toward promoting empowerment and the emancipation of rural areas.

The Ma’asina Ruru Movement

The second movement towards decentralization and self-determination was spearheaded by Aliko Nono’ohimae from Are’are, Malaita in 1945. The underlying motives behind Ma’asina Ruru were decentralization and localization (Gegeo 1994: 69). The movement rapidly spread from Malaita to Ulawa, Guadalcanal, Marau, Isabel, Makira, Neggla, and the Western Solomon Islands (Worsley 1968, Laracy 1983:21-22). In response to this movement, the colonial administrators jailed the chiefs and other leaders of the movement. However, in 1947, the Government came to realize that it must respond positively to Ma’asina Ruru demands for greater political autonomy in order to prevent another socio-political movement (Worsley 1968, Mamaloni 1981).

The Moro Movement

The third movement, which came to be known as the Moro Movement, took place on Guadalcanal in 1957 (Davenport and Coker 1967 cited in Gegeo, 1994). Like the two previous movements, the Moro movement also articulated social, political and economic autonomy. The focus however, was based on preservation of indigenous culture and the environment.

SOURCE: *Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002: Building a Nation*

⁵ The Handbook provides greater detail and includes a capacity building exercise consisting of a case study upon which to apply the tools introduced in the handbook, as well as a facilitator’s manual to guide the conduct of a capacity building workshop. For electronic copies: <http://www.lgsp.org.ph/pdf/COP-PCIA.pdf> ⁶ According to the 1999 Census. ⁷ Solomon Islands ranks 123 out of 175 countries on the Human Development index, measured by life expectancy, literacy, GDP per capita, and so on. UNDP 2002.

and limited powers, which represent the rural population's interests at the national level. Since independence in July 1978, the country's parliamentary democracy has been weakened by traditional loyalties of politicians to their home islands, by unresolved social and legal differences, particularly the conflict between customary and other forms of land use and ownership, corruption and an ineffective public service.

14. As outlined in greater detail in the report, one of the dominant stories of conflict tells of how non-violent tensions escalated among some people in Guadalcanal (Gwales) at what they perceived to be the encroachment of a settler Malaitan population on their traditional lands. Some Malaitans had lived there for more than two generations, and had acquired land 'legally' from the local population. Economic resentment smouldered among the Gwales as the government, dominated by Malaitans, was seen to fail repeatedly to respond to their demands sufficiently.

15. Conditions worsened in January 1999, when Ezekiel Alebua, premier of Guadalcanal, asked the government to pay his province for hosting the capital, Honiara, and suggested that people from outside the province should not be allowed to own land there. The Gwale population has long complained that migrants from elsewhere in the Solomon Islands are taking local jobs and land. Fighting broke out in June 1999 when militants of the Gwale-dominated Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) struck in the countryside and then moved into Honiara to physically force and terrorize Malaitans off their land. This further escalated when some Malaitans formed their own-armed Militant Group, known as the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) to protect themselves and assert their own group demands, while later in Marau, separatist demands also played out. The Malaitan militants, dominant in the security force, successfully raided police armouries, and consequently militarised the conflict through the spread of high power weapons.

16. The government declared a state of emergency, and Alebua called for a media ban on statements about "ethnic unrest" in his province. In July 1999, this facet of the conflict ended with the signing of the Honiara peace accord. Under the agreement, the militants agreed to disarm in return for *inter alia* an official review to ensure "even development" throughout the islands. However, the peace process failed, and violence continued in the year 2000. An estimated 200 people were killed and 30,000 displaced as a result of the conflict. In June 2000, an MEF-led coup took over the capital, Honiara, and captured Prime Minister Ulufa'alu, who was then forced to resign. Opposition leader Manassah Sogavare was narrowly elected as the new prime minister in an emergency vote in Parliament held on 30 June. To bring the MEF to the negotiating table, and under some duress, the new government paid \$1.6 million in compensation for lost land and damaged property suffered by the Malaitans. Following this, the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) was signed in Australia on October 14, 2000, which provided a framework for consolidating peace. It provided for a weapons and general amnesty, disarmament and demilitarisation, restructuring of the Royal Solomon Islands Police and the decommissioning of the "Joint Operations Force". It also provided for the compensation of individuals and proposed development of areas affected by the violence and displacement of people. An indigenous Peace Monitoring

Council (PMC) was charged with responsibility for monitoring the peace, with the assistance of an International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT), established at the invitation of TPA signatories.

17. However, peace remained tenuous and the police were unable to bring law and order back to Honiara. To consolidate the peace process, provincial premiers met to consider implementing a federal system. In December 2000, a blanket amnesty law for virtually all crimes committed during the three-year conflict was rushed through parliament.

18. Provisions of the TPA were never fully implemented and it failed to curtail the continuation of the conflict and continued breakdown in law and order around Honiara and in other parts of Solomon Islands. Some mitigation efforts were undertaken however: for example, the Special Police Constabulary was dramatically increased following the agreement to provide short-term employment for ex-militants. This proved to exacerbate rather than improve the law and order situation, as well as to drain scarce resources from the government.

19. Elections in 5 December 2001 returned a government with a mandate to redress the country's severe decline. Prime Minister Kemakeza and his Cabinet made efforts in early 2002 to address law and order problems, to develop credible economic policies, and to include the wider community in discussions to address the major problems facing Solomon Islands. Prime Minister Kemakeza recognized both the seriousness of the situation and that significant progress in addressing the law and order problems in Solomon Islands was a prerequisite for social and economic recovery.

20. Following agreement by the Solomon Islands Government and the Governments of Australia and New Zealand that the IPMT had done all it could to assist the peace process, the IPMT departed Solomon Islands on 25 June 2002. Australia continued to assist Solomon Islands to address the law and order situation including through working with the government and Royal Solomon Islands Police Force on a Law and Justice Sector Programme aimed at strengthening the police, prison and legal services, assisting the work of the National Peace Council - the successor to the PMC - financial support for the UNDP project for the Demobilization of Special Constables, and communications and logistics support for the Police through the Defense Cooperation Programme. The appointment of an expatriate police commissioner funded by the EU in late January 2003 was aimed at strengthening police leadership and providing impetus to rebuilding the police force.



There should be little doubt that the overall impact of RAMSI and the international donor community's assistance to the Government of Solomon Islands in the initial "post"-conflict phase of the Tensions has been positive.... tangible, measurable, and significant in the priority areas of law and order, budget stabilization, and restoration of essential government services.

21. But the prevailing atmosphere of lawlessness, with frequent outbreaks of violence, widespread extortion, and compromised nature of the Royal Solomon Islands Police, whose senior officers maintained links with criminal gangs, were significant obstacles to recovery. From late 2002, the government's ongoing commitment to reform and fiscal discipline was increasingly undermined by extortion and other intimidation directed against the Solomon Islands Government by criminal groups. The assassination of former Police Commissioner (1982-1996) and National Peace Councilor Sir Fred Soaki in Auki on 10 February 2003, and the two day closure of commercial banks in Honiara in late

May, as a result of threats, underscored the serious state of lawlessness in Solomon Islands.

22. Following a formal request for assistance from the Solomon Islands Government in July 2003, Australian and Pacific Island police and troops arrived in Solomon Islands on 24 July 2003, as part of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The mission, consisting of a policing effort, with military back-up, and a large development cooperation component, aims to restore law and order to Honiara and the other provinces of Solomon Islands, and to create an environment in which the effective functioning of Solomon Islands' democratic institutions and service delivery mechanisms can recommence.

Annex 4: Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Peace and Conflict-Related Development Analysis:
Solomon Islands
Ministry of National Unity/National Peace Council

Background

Solomon Islands is moving from a situation of recurrent conflict and conflict prone conditions to transition and recovery. Following arrival of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), security has improved markedly. Donors have released increasing amounts of funding and Government has initiated new policies, strategies and plans. In this transition period, a number of socio-economic planning exercises are underway to guide Government policy and donor support. These strategies and plans, most importantly the National Economic Recovery and Development Plan, will assist in identifying priorities, and provide for management of socio-economic recovery in the post crisis period in Solomon Islands.

To assist in consolidating lasting peace, however, an in-depth and shared understanding of peace and conflict issues is also required. In particular, Government recovery strategies, backed up by international donor assistance, will need to be conflict sensitive, avoiding harm, and where possible make a positive contribution to long term peacebuilding and reconciliation. In the transition phase and beyond, key priorities for continued work in the peacebuilding area will also need identification and long-term support.

The Ministry for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MNURP) and the National Peace Council (NPC) are the key organisations with a mandate from Government to carry out peace and reconciliation activities. Under the auspices of the MNURP, NPC has a network of monitoring posts, mostly throughout Guadalcanal and Malaita, which facilitate weapons hand-in, mediate disputes and undertake national unity initiatives. A number of NGOs also undertake peacebuilding activities. Key actors include the Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA), World Vision International, and the Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT).

One process for undertaking a broad contextual analysis and developing a forward looking, action-oriented strategy is the Peace and Conflict-related Development Analysis (PCDA). PCDA is a tool for Government, development agencies and NGOs to use for conflict reduction and to increase both the developmental and peacebuilding impact of their policies, programmes and projects in conflict situations. PCDA, or similar tools, have successfully been used in other countries at similar stages of conflict recovery such as Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda and Guatemala.

For the PCDA to be most effective, it must be integrated into development planning, implementation, monitoring and assessment, as well as institutional and national strategic planning. The exercise must therefore be iterative and ultimately appropriated by stakeholders through an open-ended consultative process. The value of the PCDA is

in its being responsive and interpretive; contributing to bridge-building in the broadest sense.

The MNURP has agreed to support a PCDA process. The NPC will facilitate the analysis as directed by the Ministry with a view to the Minister presenting the outcomes to Government, the donor community and civil society.

PCDA Methodology

Objectives

The PCDA exercise will be implemented in a flexible and responsive manner with an emphasis on meeting the emerging needs identified by key actors involved in peacebuilding and development in Solomon Islands. Broadly, the objectives of the exercise are to:

Analyse the causes of recent tensions in Solomon Islands and partial areas of conflict with particular reference to development dimensions
Formulate recommendations for donor and Government strategy for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation
Conduct capacity building exercises, including a workshop on conflict assessment and planning workshop for forward strategies with NPC.

The PCDA will also integrate conflict considerations into the economic recovery and rehabilitation plans and strategies of the Government and donors (e.g. complementing the National Economic Recovery Development Programme); review and strengthen current and planned development programme links to peacebuilding and reconciliation; and assist in the identification and design of key future conflict-related projects.

Scope and activities

There are three components of the PCDA⁸:

Analysis of the variable structures and processes of peace and conflict
Mapping of Stakeholder views and responses
Identification of gaps and recommendations for strategic actions

First, the causes (structural, proximate, and perpetuating) and effects of conflicts will be identified and examined. For example, conflicts concerning land ownership, internal migration, control of political power, poverty, ethnicization, access to, or use of, natural resources, class competition, settler-indigenous relations, economic competition, and so on. It is recognized, that in most (if not all) violence-prone regions, many different conflicts affect each other. The essential questions here concern when, why and how did/does/ might non-violent conflict turn or return violent? This component of PCDA should also include an assessment of peacebuilding resources and opportunities within

⁸ Assumptions: Each conflict is unique: analysis should be conflict-specific; Conflicts are exacerbated by multiple connected causes; Some actors have an interest in promoting conflict; Development can be a causal factor in conflict as well as a response; Development agencies should 'do no harm'; They should also maximise their impact on conflict reduction.

the Solomon Islands and regionally. The interaction of causes may be modelled using a matrix.

It is important to link causes and effects together in order to develop a model (or models) of peace and conflict dynamics over time in different communities and different areas. This may, for example, illuminate the ways in which “conflict entrepreneurs” exploit, and then harness, violent and non-violent tensions in the pursuit of particularistic social, economic, and political objectives. This is often quite separate from the original “causes.”

The table below illustrates some of the analytical issues, which may arise when four general analytical categories are examined multi-dimensionally.

Table 1: Peacebuilding and Conflict Analysis: Example of Causes of Conflict

	Security		Political		Economic		Social	
	Sources of Conflict	Sources of Peace building	Sources of Conflict	Sources of Peace building	Sources of Conflict	Sources of Peace building	Sources of Conflict	Sources of Peace building
International								
Regional								
National								
Provincial/Community								

In practice, most of the analytical issues identified in each cell crosscut levels of analysis. And, the exercise illustrated in this table should be complemented by an analysis of structures, processes, and dynamics of peace. Otherwise, the exercise may produce a skewed picture that sketches out the universe of problems, but offers no insights into the range of constructive/ peacebuilding responses.

Once the peacebuilding and conflict landscape has been mapped, it is possible to more systematically identify those factors which enabled non-violent conflict to turn violent – or put another way, those factors which encouraged the use of violence as a means of addressing political, economic or social problems. These connections can be used to identify indicators for use in early warning systems, or as points of reference in the long process of war-to-peace “transition.” There is then a clearer, and concrete, sense of what to do, and what NOT to do. From this analysis, which will be done in a participatory workshop and through consultations and field visits, the key actors are identified and their interests are examined.

Second, an assessment of previous and current Government and donor responses. The aim of this section is to compare the activities currently taking place, especially in development, with the analysis of causes. This will include: mapping the views of the international community, civil society and development organisations in relation to political, economic and social issues, identifying activities that work ‘around’, ‘in’ and ‘on’ conflict, and effectiveness of development cooperation responses. This component will provide general conclusions and identify current Government and donor activities that have high, low, no, or negative impacts on:

aggravating, generating, or reducing conflict; or nurturing or creating peacebuilding structures and processes.

The third component of PCDA will bring together the analysis of causes with that of current responses in order to identify gaps and to make recommendations for future strategies. A comparison of causes and responses leads to the strategic conclusions of the PCDA process. Recommendations will be made concerning current and future policies, programmes, and projects to be carried forward by the international community, government, and civil society, bearing in mind the need for coherence, effective advocacy, and programmatic responses.

Timing and Deliverables

The results of the PCDA process will be a critical input to government policy and planning, as well as donor planning, resource mobilization, and coordinated assistance. It is proposed that the PCDA be undertaken in three stages:

Preparation (2-3 days, February 2004):

The first phase will be a desk review and synthesis of all available assessments; surveys and studies. Key documents include: Donor Country Strategy Papers, Government Policy Paper on Conflict Prevention and Management, the NERDP, NPC's National Unity Summit Report, the consultation on Constitutional Reform. This will be put together in advance of the mission being fielded to Solomon Islands.

Preparations will be carried out in-country including briefings to Government and donors, and organization of agendas, events and field visits.

Consultations, field visits (2 weeks, 25 February 2004):

This phase would be conducted in the field. It would initially focus on consultations with government and donors and other stakeholders, and extend to field visits to affected areas. A Peacebuilding Forum will be held with NPC, Government Ministries, civil society, donors and other key stakeholders, with a view to sharing views, and imparting such skills to local partners.

Informal workshops with country specialists will be organised at the outset of the exercise to examine the key conflict issues identified, explain the goals of the experience and to obtain buy-in by various stakeholders. Later, focus group meetings may be organized to discuss key themes or issues identified by the team.

Analysis and reporting (1 week 8 March 2004):

This phase would immediately follow, consisting of an initial synthesis of the various report components into a draft assessment and consultation with local stakeholders, followed by the drafting of a final report to be submitted to the Ministry of National Unity and NPC, and presented to the Solomon Islands Government, civil society and the donor community in a workshop environment.

A concluding informal workshop will discuss integration into poverty reduction and national recovery strategies, donor country strategies, and programme activities. The

PCDA team will organise informal sessions around peace and conflict issues with key development sector specialists.

Expected PCDA Team Outputs

The following are the expected outputs from the team:

Draft and final reports (20-30 pages) containing the following:

A review of past assessments, studies and assessment of the previous assistance programmes to peacebuilding in Solomon Islands.

Results of the PCDA exercise

Recommendations for a Solomon Islands Peacebuilding Strategy and Priority Donor Support Activities and Actions, including the roles of Solomon Islands Government institutions.

A draft framework for peace and conflict analysis for the NPC or other monitoring institution – to be updated regularly (5-10 pages)

A layperson's write up of major findings and recommendations (2-3 pages), and,

A power point presentation of the major findings and recommendations of the exercise for various audiences.

Follow-up and Integrating the PCDA results into Strategy

The Minister of National Unity, with support by the NPC, will take forward the PCDA and resulting strategy in policy and Government strategies, especially in dialogues with the donor community through the Ministry of National Planning.

Specifically, the recently adopted National Economic Recovery and Development Plan (NERDP) will be informed by, in its implementation, the results and recommendations emanating from the PCDA.

Donor country strategies and programmes will be encouraged to consider the analysis results, and be guided by the Government strategy in this area. Further, work plans of the Ministry of National Unity and the NPC, will build from the priorities identified for 2004-2005.

An on-going process of PCDA capacity building among all stakeholders will be nurtured drawing on existing and evolving expertise in this field.

PCDA Mission Composition

The PCDA Team would consist of two qualified international technical specialists (totalling 30 working days), and a local coordinator. Experts would specialize in one or more of the following: PCDA methodology, Melanesian conflict resolution, and Solomon Islands or the region.

The PCDA will be led by the NPC, under the auspices of the MNURP, and with support from the above external expertise contracted by UNDP (including on the ground backstopping from a UNDP Sub-Office staff member). NPC, with the support and possible involvement of interested donors, will also provide advice and oversight to the expert team and set up consultations and workshops.

A small 'Friends of the PCDA' group will be established, chaired by NPC, and made up of interested Ministries, donors and community leaders, to guide the process. The group will meet regularly throughout the exercise and will be a sounding board as the PCDA progresses.

Annex 5 Consultation List

FRIENDS OF PCDA	
Joini Tutua: NPC Counsellor (Choiseul)	
Hilda Kari: NPC Counsellor (Honiara)	
Ronald Fugui: NPC Counsellor (Malaita)	
Natascha Sparke: NPC Policy Adviser	
Trisha Gray: AusAID	
Alison Chartres: AusAID	
Jennifer Poole: World Vision International	
Caitlin Wilson: AusAID	
Michael Kalilu: UNDP	
Other NPC Counsellors	
MINISTER OF NATIONAL UNITY, PEACE AND RECONCILIATION	
Hon. Nathaniel Waena	
NATIONAL PEACE COUNCIL	
Paul Tovua: Chairman, Guadalcanal rep	
Augustine Rose: Central rep	
Nathaniel Supa: Secretary	
Joini Tutua, Choiseul	
Dykes Angika: Rennell- Bellona Rep	
Danny Philip, Western rep	
Hilda Kari, Honiara rep	
Dennis Lulei: Vice Chairman: Isabel rep.	
Frank Pororara: Makira rep	
Joy Kere – Honiara Rep	
Ronald Fugui: Malaita rep	
Danny McAvoy: Policy Advisor	
Natascha Spark: Advisor	
And NPC MONITORS	
PERMANENT SECRETARIES	
Nairie Alamu: PS National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace	
John Tuhaika: PS Provincial Government	
Steve Likaveke: PS Lands – Acting Commissioner	
Derek Sikua: PS Education	
Donald Kudu: PS Planning	
Ethyl Sigimanu: PS Home Affairs	
Ruth Liloqula: Acting PS Police and National Security	
NGO CONSULTATION	
Jennifer Poole	Country Programme Manager World Vision
Liz Baldwin	BESO Representative and involved in village and disability support projects
Cherry Galo	Country Director, ADRA (Adventist Development Agency)
Alfred Kiva	Provincial Coordinator

WOMENS CONSULTATION	
Yvonne Kwaimani	SDA Coordinator SDA SICA FOW REP
Jean Tafoa	UNIFEM Coordinator
Naelyn John	Ass. Coordinator SDA SICA FOW
Hilda T Kari	NPC Councillor
Josephine Teakeni	Director, Vois blong mere Solomon
Anne Saenemua	Women's Coordinator SICA Federation of Women
Sandra Ollie Povana	General Secretary Provincial Mothers Union
Jemimah Tagini	National trainer SSEC SICA Fed of Women
Cynthia Kisiau	Participant
BUSINESS CONSULTATION	
Mike Hammond	Karomulua Island Solomon Sports Fishing
Joe Sika	Tongs Cooperation's Ltd
Johnson Lucas	Pacrim Resources Ltd
Andrew Anderson	Gou and Partners
Peter Shanel	Gold Ridge Mining
Joseph Anea	Solomon Airlines
CHURCH CONSULTATION	
Father Norman Arkwright – Rep of Archbishop	Archdiocese of Honiara
Eric Takila	President of SSEC
Rev. Caleb Kotali	United Church
Emmanuel Iyabora	General Secretary SICA/ Christian Assoc
POLITICAL CONSULTATION	
Francis Hilly	MP Western Task Force Law and Order
J Oti	MP Responsible for Commerce / Aviation/ Meteorology
Fred Fono	MP Deputy Speaker
Sir Baddeley Devesi	Previous Governor General and Deputy Prime Minister (1998-99)

PEACEBUILDING FORUM	
Augustine Rose	Councillor, NPC
Nathaniel Supa	Secretary, NPC
Paul Tovua	Chairman NPC
Hendrick Smits	EU Charge d'affaires
Michael Shih	Councillor Embassy of China
Atsuko Orimoto	Researcher/ Advisor Embassy of Japan
John Roughan	Advisor, SIDT
Kiethie Saunders	US Consular Agent
Jennifer Poole	Country Programme Manager World Vision SI
Rose Maebiru	Youth Programme Manager Save the Children Australia
Sarah Dyer	President, SI National Council of Women
Andrew Nori	Legal Practitioner
Joini Tutua	NPC Councillor
Ruth Lilogula	PS Police and National Security
Natascha Spark	NPC Advisor
Hilda Kari	NPC Councillor
Emmanuel Iyabora	General Secretary
Steve Likaveke	PS/ Acting Commissioner of Lands Dept of Lands and Survey
Dykes Angika	Councillor NPC
Danny Philip	Councillor NPC
Trisha Gray	2 nd Secretary AusAID
Claire Beck	Programme Officer – Relief World Vision Australia
Edward Arisitolo	Youth Officer, Dep't. Home Affairs
Bruce Saunders	Chamber of Commerce Rep.
Donald Kudu	PS Ministry of National Planning
Judi Patterson	Community Peace and Restoration Fund
WESTERN PROVINCE GOVERNMENT	
Narcily Pule	Provincial Secretary
Soly Maezamn	Deputy Premier
WESTERN PROVINCE COMMUNITY	
Jerry Tumur	Branch Manager, Bowmans Ltd
Abraham Viga	Senior Peer Educator, Save the Children Australia
Hector Jmelani	Youth Representative, Western Methodist Church
Neipare Ruma	Director Methodist WWMI
Naolyn Takotoko	Tailor
Anna Sina	Housewife, Anglican mother's union
Caroline W Soquilo	Co-President, United Church Women's Fellowship
Minam Mailce	Co-President, United Church Women's Fellowship
Edina Takili	Housewife, United Church Women's Fellowship
Andy Fomani	Women's Rep, SSEC
Raewyn Mage	ECE Trainer, Education Division
Daley Sito	Principal Senior Inspector, Education Division (MEHRD)

Nelson Theomae	Reverend/ Parish Priest, Anglican Community Gizo
Getor Pilee	Chief
Nathaniel-Edali	Youth Leader, Chairman Youth Group of Anglican Community
Raymond Jio	Church Representative, CARITAS
Hazel Tanweke	Secretary, Gizo Women's Association
Rose Simbe	Personal Secretary, Premier's Office
Bunata Talasasa	Rep GWA, Gizo
Alan Takanunv	Youth Rep, SSEC Gizo
Alpheus Olivera	Church Rep, Ark Ministry
Jeffrey Taumsan	Western Province Youth Council/ Sports
Ian Ronnie	President, Western Province Board of Counsellors
Joseph Lalaubatu	Diocesan Youth and Media Coordinator, Catholic Church
Moses No Kapa	Ark Ministry Student, Gizo
Alex Jio	Youth Member, Catholic Church
Kevin Paia	Manager, Motel New Georgia
Henry Mamupio	Minister of Uniting Church
Evan Maike	Businessman, Gizo
Jillah Sambe Pardad	Self-employed, Gizo
Roben Zyty	Youth leader, SDA Church
Sina Ndrian	Programme Officer, Radio Support (Gizo, SIBC)
Iodine Panasasa	Business owner, ISP Food Bar
Samson Maena	Gizo Hospital, CFC
Charles Manetarai	Gizo Hospital
Samae Liva	Suva Community, SDA Church
Ben Liva	Suva Community, SDA Church
John Goldi	Simbo Chief, United Church
Moffat Maeta	JP Café Owner, Private Business
Grace Hemmer	Gizo, CLW
Wendy Pana	CPRF Gizo
Russell Korokini	Youth Coordinator, Uniting Church
Danny Kennedy	Business Owner
Annie	CPRF Gizo
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	
Nick Hartmann	Peace and Development Coordinator, UNDP Honiara Sub-Office
Tadashi Ikashiro	Director, Japanese International Cooperation Agency
Nick Warner	Special Coordinator, Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
Hendrik Smets	Charge d' Affairs, European Union
Patrick Cole	Australian High Commissioner
Peter Noble (tbc)	RAMSI
Judi Patterson	Director, Community Peace and Restoration Fund
Rod Little	Australian Team Leader, Solomon Islands Institutional and Strengthening of Land Administration Project
Wayne Woolf	Australian Team Leader, Solomon Islands Forestry Management Project

Val Stanley	Welfare Advisor, Solomon Islands Law and Justice Sector Institutional Strengthening Programme
Tom Woods	UNDP Constitutional Reform
Ken Avairre	Public Solicitor
Frank Byrne	Advisor (Operations Strategy) Solomon Islands Law and Justice Sector Institutional Strengthening Programme
Brian Sanders	NZ High Commissioner
Lenore Hamilton	Technical Advisor: Solomon Islands Law and Justice Sector Institutional Strengthening Programme
YOUNG PEOPLE IN HONIARA	
Leonard Jones	Volunteer, Save the Children Australia and former militant
Several young men	Former MEF militants
Others	
Representatives from the Chinese Community	
UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND	
Kevin Clement	Professor, Director Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
Leo White	Assoc Professor, Lawyer/ Mediator
Peter Dart	Research Fellow: Forestry Sector
Morgan Brigg	PHD Studies in Conflict

KAKABONA COMMUNITY (RURAL GUADALCANAL)	Numerous community members
ARILIGO COMMUNITY (RURAL GUADALCANAL)	Numerous community members
NPC Monitors, Guadalcanal	
Kasiano Tovua Mary Fays Maeni Francis Maisi Charity Adams Clement Pende Gorreti Mane Judah Sikua Charles Fox Alfred Lova Stephen LeuaSilas Tovusi Catherene Kakamo Redely Varakea Peter Waitasi Gabriel Limah Peter Kulubau Denisa Solomae Anna Teteuna Christopher Beku Alphonsus Buto Willie Kavigao Jack Tangi Veronica Gua Goreti Sura	Jesmel Kesi Nathaniel Raitoga Apolos Piri Uriel Misi Timothy Tsilivi Abigail Dakinitasi Margaret Vogo Cyril Kulisuia Nelson Sutahi Arthur Niaba Israel Manakasi Claudias Sarai Jenifer Waruhena Dolrita Laka Joseph Hessemate Anthony Hurua Francis Henry Stephany Eddy Dominic Buataiga Nelson Sabino Michael Kamana Benedict Pitu Bobby Aron Wesley Manechonia Belinda Ricky Aedalyn Para Vovo Henry Pitu
NPC Monitors, Malaita	
Mathes Iroga Nelso Puiaraha Augustine Faliomea Esther Maefunu David Ugulu Paul Arohonesia Emily Fagasi Miriam Sipisoa Justine Maelifaka	Israel Maeke Jesmiel Menia Kelly Maeagalo Peter Taloi Kwanairara Ellen Kanatolea Veronica Leah David Faiga Rachel Nafomea,